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Private Records, Sexual Activity Evidence, and  









The Parliament of Canada has created a new regime dictating the process and admissibility 
criteria for private records (potentially including digital communications such as text messages, 
email and some social media posts) that are in the accused's possession in sexual assault 
proceedings.  The legislation also includes new procedural requirements for applications to 
introduce evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity under section 276 of the Criminal 
Code.  Several courts have concluded that various parts of these new provisions – which some 
have nicknamed the ‘Ghomeshi Rules’ – are unconstitutional.  The problem with these decisions 
is that in each one the court has failed to properly balance the competing interests at 
stake.  Stated most plainly, each of them overstates the impact of these provisions on the 
accused’s right to a fair trial and understates the competing interests to be balanced in an analysis 
of the constitutionality of these new laws. This article confronts two problematic aspects of the 
assessment of the impact on the accused’s rights in these cases: hyperbolic assertions about the 
impact of notice to the complainant on the right to cross-examination and assumptions about the 
impact of disclosure to the complainant on the truth-seeking function of the trial.  This analysis is 
done, in part, through a case study of the trial transcript in R v Ghomeshi because several of 
these cases appear to have been litigated or adjudicated in the shadow of Ghomeshi. The article 
concludes with an assessment of the competing interests that must be balanced with the 
accused’s right to a fair trial: the complainant’s privacy, equality and dignity interests and the 
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II. Assessing the Impact of the 278.92 Regime on the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial 
i. Overstating the impact of the 278.92 regime on the right to cross-examination 
1. DeCoutere’s increased celebrity and media attention as a consequence 
of this case 
2. Challenges to the plausibility of DeCoutere’s version of events, 
including what she remembered 
3. DeCoutere’s motivation for, and feelings about, reporting Ghomeshi to 
the police 
4. DeCoutere’s post-incident romantic/sexual feelings towards, and 
contact with, Ghomeshi 
ii. Assumptions About the Impact on the Truth-Seeking Function of the Trial  
iii. The section 278.92 regime does not violate the right against self-incrimination 
III. The Constitutionally Protected Interests Legislated under the Section 278.92 Regime 
i. The right to a fair trial is not the only principle of fundamental justice at issue  
ii. The nature of the privacy interest protected by the section 278.92 must be 
understood in context 
iii. The protected interests legislated under the sexual assault provisions of the 
Criminal Code are both substantive and procedural 
1. A fair trial requires that Crowns perform their duty to properly consult 
and prepare vulnerable witnesses such as sexual assault complainants  
2. Routinely Permitting Mid-trial Applications Will Result in Bifurcated 
Trials That Impose Significant Harms on Complainants 
3. Equal protection of the law demands that, to the extent possible, 
complainants have the ability to make an informed decision about 







In December, 2018 Parliament enacted Bill-C51, which included amendments to the 
Criminal Code to add a new regime dictating the process and admissibility criteria for private 
records in the possession of an accused in a sexual assault proceeding.1  The legislation also 
includes new procedural requirements for applications to introduce evidence of a complainant’s 
other sexual activity under section 276 of the Criminal Code.2  These revisions were adopted in an 
 
1 Bill C-51, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential 
amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, (assented to 13 December 2018), SC 2018, c 29 [Bill C-51]. 
2 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 ss 278.92 – 278.96 [Criminal Code]. 
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effort to fill a gap in the statutory regime with respect to the admissibility of a complainant’s 
private records, and strengthen the procedural elements of the rules governing admissibility of 
evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity .3  The government’s objectives in enacting the 
amendments parallel those pursued through Canada’s rape shield regime: to maintain the rights of 
the accused while also protecting the dignity, equality and privacy interests of complainants and 
promoting society’s interest in encouraging sexual assault survivors to come forward.4 
The constitutionality of these new provisions, referred to here as the section 278.92 regime, 
is now being assessed by lower courts across the country, and will be examined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 2021.5  While some courts have upheld the new regime,6 several others have 
found parts of it to be an unjustifiable infringement of the accused’s Charter rights.7  
The section 278.92 regime includes two changes to the Criminal Code that have garnered 
constitutional scrutiny.  First, the regime creates a process for, and admissibility criteria regarding, 
records that are in the accused’s possession and which contain personal information in which the 
complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.8  The process for applications to introduce 
these private records in the accused’s possession requires that they be brought at least 7 days in 
advance [of trial9] and that they be disclosed to the complainant.  The complainant has standing to 
make submissions on the admissibility of the records, and the right to be represented at the 
admissibility hearing.10  
Second, the new regime adopts this same process for section 276 applications.  In other 
words, under the section 278.92 regime complainants are to be provided with the accused’s 
application to introduce evidence of her sexual history 7 days in advance of trial, and they have 
 
3 Prior to the enactment of Bill C-51 this gap was addressed through a common law regime established in cases like 
R v Osolin [1993] 3 SCR 313 and R v Shearing, [2002] 3 SCR 333.  This gap in the statutory regime was highlighted 
in a 2012 report from the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 
4 Factum of the Appellant, R v JJ 2020 BCSC 29 (leave to appeal granted: 2020 CanLII 48929) citing: House of 
Commons Debates, 42nd Parl., 1st Sess., No. 195 (15 June 2017), at 12806 (1640) House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess., No. 70 (18 October 2017), at 1535, 1615; House of 
Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess., No 249 (11 December 2017), at 1205; Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st  
Sess, Vol. 150, No. 182 (15 February 2018), at 1540; Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess., Vol. 150, No. 233 (3 
October 2018), at 6417-6419.  
5 R v JJ, 2020 BCSC 29 (leave to appeal granted: 2020 CanLII 48929) [JJ]). 
6 See e.g. R. v. C. C., 2019 ONSC 6449; R. v. A.C., 2019 ONSC 4270; R v Whitehouse 2020 NSSC 87; R v FA 2019 
NCJ 391. 
7 See e.g. R v AM [2019] SJ No 303 [AM]; R. v. Anderson, 2019 SKQB 304 [Anderson]; R v DLB, 2020 YKTC 8 
[hereinafter DLB]; R v JS, [2019] A.J. No. 1639 (Q.B.); R v Reddick 2020 ONSC 156 [Reddick].  In R v ARS, 2019 
ONCJ 645 [ARS], R v AM 2020 ONSC 4541 (CanLII) [AM (ON)] and JJ, supra note 3 the courts found that the 
provisions were only constitutional if the accused was permitted to bring the application once the complainant had 
testified.  In JJ, supra note 5 Justice Duncan stipulated that the application was to be brought before cross-examination, 
and confined her reasoning to applications to rely on private records in the possession of the accused.  In ARS, ibid 
Justice Breen stipulated that the applications could be brought at any time.  He read down the provision to eliminate 
the 7 day notice requirement for applications to introduce either section 276 evidence or private records in the 
possession of the accused.  Justice Christie reasoned similarly in AM (ON). 
8 Criminal Code, supra note 2, s. 278.92. 
9 Some courts (see e.g. AM (ON) supra note 7) have argued that the provision’s wording suggests that the 7 day notice 
period does not mean 7 days in advance of trial but rather 7 days in advance of the admissibility hearing.  For a 
compelling rejection of this interpretation of the provision see R v MS, [2019] OJ No 4866 at para 98 – 100.  
10 Criminal Code, supra note 2 ss 278.93 – 278.94.  
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the right to make submissions on the admissibility of this evidence, either themselves or through 
their legal counsel. 
The main challenge to the constitutionality of the section 278.92 regime is the assertion 
that the provisions violate the accused’s fair trial rights (primarily under section 7 of the Charter11) 
by disclosing these applications to complainants in advance of trial.  While courts have focussed 
on different aspects of the regime, in nearly all of the cases which have found a violation of section 
7 of the Charter the determination that the regime or parts of the regime are unconstitutional is 
related to the impact on the accused’s fair trial rights caused by providing complainants with 
knowledge of the records or section 276 evidence in advance of trial.  The problem with these 
decisions is that they fail to properly balance the competing interests at stake.  Stated most plainly, 
each of them overstates the impact of these provisions on the accused’s right to a fair trial and 
understates the competing interests to be balanced in an analysis of the constitutionality of this 
regime. 
 
A Note About ‘Records’ 
 
The new regime relies upon the same provision of the Criminal Code, section 278.1, to 
define “record” that is used to define record for purposes of the section 278 third-party record 
regime: “any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”.12  Several courts have recognized that record, for purposes of the new 
regime, may include digital communications such as text messages, emails, and social media 
posts.13  This makes sense.  Courts have accepted that the scope of records included in section 
278.1 in relation to third-party records applications include digital communications, if the 
communications contain content in which the complainant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.14  It would be incoherent for the same provision of the Criminal Code to define the same 
record differently depending on its possessor.   
 
11 While defence counsel have invoked both section 7 and section 11 of the Charter, and some courts have found 
violations under both provisions (see e.g. DLB, supra note 7; Anderson, supra note 7; Reddick, supra note 7), most 
courts have focussed the analysis on section 7 given that many of the rights explicitly protected under section 11 are 
included in the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 (see e.g. ARS, supra note 7; JJ, supra note 5.) 
12 Criminal Code, supra note 2, s. 278.1.  The third-party records regime creates a procedure, and restraint on the 
ability of the accused, to subpoena a complainant’s private records from a third-party. 
13 See e.g. R v. RMR 2019 BCSC 1093 at para 26; R v Tanasijevic, [2020] O.J. No. 566.  
14 See e.g. R. v. Taseen, [2017] O.J. No. 6580 at para 34 (concluding that the accused’s request that the Crown disclose 
digital communications between the complainant and a third-party was subject to the third-party records regime); R. 
v. Moskalyk, [2017] O.J. No. 5749 (defence counsel initially included Facebook posts in a third-party records 
application but the complainant subsequently consented to their disclosure); R. v. Z.N., 2018 ONCJ 501 at para 5 
(accepting Crown’s concession that the complainant’s text messages should not have been disclosed to the accused 
without a section 278 application); R v Ghomeshi 2016 ONCJ 155 (CanLII) (defence counsel brought a third-party 
records application to obtain emails between the complainants).   
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Courts have been more divided as to whether complainants have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in digital communications between themselves and the accused.15  This issue was not 
explicitly addressed in the decisions that have found the new regime unconstitutional.  In some of 
these cases it was not relevant,16 and in others the court impliedly conceded that communications 
between the complainant and the accused do constitute records for the purposes of the section 
278.92 regime.17 It is assumed here that communications between the complainant and the accused 




Determining the constitutionality of the section 278.92 regime requires assessing whether 
it strikes a just balance between the impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial and the other 
constitutional interests the regime seeks to protect.  This is a difficult assessment – one which 
requires careful excavation of the underlying interests. An examination of lower court decisions 
which have considered the constitutionality of these provisions suggests further excavation is 
required.   
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II assesses the impact that the new 
regime will have on an accused’s right to a fair trial.  This requires confronting two problematic 
aspects of the assessment of the impact on the accused’s rights in these cases: hyperbolic assertions 
about the impact of notice to the complainant on the right to cross-examination and; assumptions 
about the impact of disclosure to the complainant on the truth-seeking function of the trial.  This 
analysis is done, in part, through a case study of the trial transcript in R v Ghomeshi because several 
of the section 278.92 cases appear to have been litigated or adjudicated in the shadow of Ghomeshi.  
Part II also considers and rejects the conclusion that this regime violates the accused’s right against 
self-incrimination. 
Part III turns to the other side of the calculus: the additional constitutional interests that the 
section 278.92 regime seeks to protect.  The constitutionality of the section 278.92 regime turns 
on whether the provisions strike a just balance between an accused’s fair trial rights and the 
complainant’s dignity, equality, and privacy interests, along with broader societal interests in 
 
15 Digital communications between complainant and accused were or could be records: R v MS, [2019] OJ No 4866; 
R v TA, [2020] O.J. No. 1831. Digital communications between the complainant and accused not considered records: 
R. v WM 2019 ONSC 6535; R. v Mai 2019 ONSC 6691; R v AM [2020] OJ No 1345. 
16 For example, in Reddick, supra note 7 the evidence at issue came within the scope of section 276.  It had nothing to 
do with digital communications between the complainant and the accused.   
17 For example, in several of these cases (JJ, supra note 5; Anderson, supra note 7; AM, supra note 7) the Court 
pointed to the cross-examination in R v Ghomeshi, supra note 14 (large parts of which were based on records of digital 
communication between the complainant and the accused) as an example of a defence that would be lost to the accused 
under the new regime.  In some of these cases the records at issue were digital communications between the 
complainant and the accused (see e.g. JJ, supra note 5 (digital communications containing nude photographs of the 
complainant; AM, supra note 7 (text messages from complainant to a third party); Anderson, supra note 7 (digital 
communications). 
18 This assumption is premised largely on the basis of the analysis developed by Justice Chapman in MS, supra note 
9 at para 50.  Justice Chapman identified 16 factors, based on privacy law, that should inform judicial assessments of 
whether a record is within the scope of section 278.1.  
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ensuring a fair and humane process.  To date, cases concluding that the regime, or parts of it, are 
unconstitutional have failed to properly recognize the competing constitutional interests at issue.  
Part III explores three ways in which this tends to occur: a failure to recognize the competing 
principles of fundamental justice; a failure to properly assess the privacy interest at stake; and an 
unfounded conclusion that these legislative measures in place in Canadian sexual assault law to 
protect complainants can be reduced to limits on the admissibility of evidence of sexual history or 
private records.  To the contrary, the section 278.92 regime provides important substantive and 
procedural protections to sexual assault complainants. 
 
II. Assessing the Impact of the 278.92 Regime on the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial 
 
There are two problematic trends related to the assessment of the impact on the accused’s 
rights in the cases which have found the regime, or part of the regime, unconstitutional.  First, in 
some cases courts appear to have overstated the impact on the accused’s right to full answer and 
defence – primarily by asserting that disclosing these applications to complainants prior to trial is 
entirely novel or that it will “eviscerate”19 the accused’s right to cross-examination.  These 
assertions unfairly compromise the balancing exercise required.  Second, the assessment of the 
impact on the accused’s fair trial rights in several cases appears to be premised on a questionable 
assumption about the impact that the regime will have on the truth-seeking function of the trial. 
 
i. Overstating the impact of the 278.92 regime on the right to cross-examination 
 
There are two ways in which some courts are overstating the impact of the section 278.92 
regime on the accused’s right to cross-examination.  The first involves the assertion that providing 
complainants with advance notice of evidence the defence intends to rely upon for impeachment 
purposes is novel.  The second involves the unsubstantiated assertion that granting a complainant 
access to these applications will render meaningless, or eviscerate, defence counsel’s ability to 
cross-examine her. 
Consider first the novelty claim.  Some courts have relied upon the erroneous conclusion 
that providing complainants with notice of aspects of the accused’s case, and granting them 
standing to make submissions on the admissibility of private records or sexual history evidence 
that the defence seeks to rely upon, are “unprecedented”20 and “entirely new innovation[s]”.21   
This is incorrect.  
Complainants already have standing in proceedings both to determine the production of 
private records to the accused, and to address the use of private records already in the possession 
of the accused.22  Section 278.3 of the Criminal Code mandates that a complainant be served with 
 
19Anderson, supra note 7 at para 21. 
20 See e.g. AM, supra note 7 at para 24. Judge Henning stated that “[t]he making of a complainant a party to a hearing 
to determine the use of such material is innovative.”   
21 Ibid at para 23 
22 Criminal Code, supra note 2 section 278.3; Shearing, supra note 3 at para 102. 
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any application by an accused to produce third-party records in which she has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.23   Complainants have a statutory right to appear and make submissions at 
any hearing regarding an application by the defence to obtain third-party records in which she has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.   Complainants also have standing in voir dires to determine 
the admissibility of records in which they have a privacy interest.  The Supreme Court implicitly 
recognized this in R v Shearing.24  Subsequent courts have followed this procedure.25  As Justice 
Breen observed in R v ARS: “third parties are routinely afforded standing in criminal proceedings 
when their rights are engaged.”26 Granting complainants notice of an application and standing on 
the admissibility of her private records is not unprecedented. Our assessment of the impact of the 
section 278.92 regime on the rights of the accused should not be premised on the understanding 
that this an entirely new circumstance.   
The conclusion that the section 278.92 regime is unconstitutional is primarily premised on 
the detrimental effect that notice and disclosure to the complainant could have on an accused’s 
right to cross-examination.27  The primary detrimental effect identified is the risk that the 
complainant will modify her testimony in light of what she learns from the application.28   This is 
a critically important concern and one that must be grappled with in analyzing the constitutionality 
of the section 278.92 regime.  However, tackling this issue requires contending with the fact that 
complainants already had notice, disclosure, and standing with respect to an accused’s efforts to 
obtain third-party records.  They also already had informal notice and some disclosure regarding 
any evidence of their other sexual activity that the accused seeks to rely upon.29   
In some cases, courts have grappled with this reality - typically by attempting to distinguish 
between these other/prior regimes and the section 278.92 regime.  Not all of these attempts are 
compelling.   For instance, in R v DLB, in considering the records in the possession of the accused 
aspect of the regime, Judge Ruddy suggests that the complainant’s privacy and equality interests 
are of a different, lesser nature than would be the case with respect to third-party records (and 
section 276 evidence).30 He concludes that records in the possession of the accused are 
“dramatically less” likely to be highly sensitive and private than are third-party records and section 
276 evidence.31 This is unconvincing.  First, some of the records in the accused’s possession may 
be third-party records for purposes of section 278.  In other words, the regime captures third-party 
 
23 Criminal Code, ibid. 
24 R v Shearing, supra note 3 at para 102 .  In Shearing the complainant’s objection to cross-examination based on the 
contents of her diary resulted in a voir dire in which her lawyer made extensive submissions on its use. 
25 Courts have also recognized that sexual assault complainants are to be given notice and granted standing to make 
submissions on the use of private records obtained unlawfully by the accused or through a civil proceeding C(S) v 
S(N), 2017 ONSC 353.  See Daniel Brown and Jill Witkin, Prosecuting and Defending Sexual Offence Cases, (Emond 
Publishing: Toronto, 2018) at p 309. 
26 Supra note 7 at para 82 
27 See e.g. AM, supra note 7 at para 36; ARS, supra note 7 at para 78 
28 See e.g. Anderson, supra note 7; ARS, supra note 7; DLB, supra note 7; JJ, supra note 5; AM, supra note 7. 
29 R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 at para. 55: “The Crown as well as the Court must get the detailed affidavit one 
week before the voir dire, according to s. 276.1(4)(b), in part to allow the Crown to consult with the complainant.” 
30 Supra note 7 at paras 72-77. 
31 Supra note 7 at para 77. 
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records that happen to be in the accused’s possession. Second, there are records explicitly included 
in the third-party records regime, such as employment and education records,32 which could not 
reasonably be characterized as more sensitive, or more private, than some of the records in the 
possession of the accused that are captured by the section 278.92 regime.  
Compare, for example, school attendance records not in the possession of the accused (and 
thus covered under the third-party records regime) with emails sent from the complainant to the 
accused’s mother discussing the complainant’s mental illness diagnosis, intellectual disability, or 
the physical abuse she suffered as a child.   Assume the accused’s mother has provided them to 
the accused.  These emails would be covered under the section 278.92 regime.  Surely emails of 
this nature suggest a higher order of privacy and equality interests than would typically be the case 
with respect to school attendance records.  Moreover, they include the type of evidence that ought 
to be pre-screened because it is sometimes relied upon to discredit complainants on the basis of 
problematic social assumptions about women and gender-based violence -  assumptions about the 
lack of credibility or reliability of women with mental illness, disability or histories of abuse.33  
Given the high likelihood that a complainant and an accused are known to each other, the 
possibility that an accused is in possession of such highly personal, sensitive and potentially 
prejudicial records is not, as Judge Ruddy suggests, remote.34 
In AM, Judge Henning also attempts to distinguish the section 278 and 276 regimes from 
the new provisions.  He suggests that the third-party records regime and the rules regarding 
evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity are “well understood and accepted”, but asserts 
that there are “significant differences” between the impugned regime and the (prior) section 276 
and section 278 regimes.35  However, Judge Henning’s reasons do not identify a difference 
between the impact on cross-examination of disclosure to the complainant under the section 276 
and 278 regimes and the impact of disclosure to the complainant under the records in the 
possession of the accused provisions (which is the part of the regime he was addressing).  He does 
not explain why the knowledge a complainant gains through the impugned proceeding creates a 
risk of modified testimony that is not presented by what he describes as the “well understood and 
accepted” third-party records and (prior) section 276 regimes.  Instead, in an example of circular 
 
32 Criminal Code, supra note 2, section 278.1. 
33 See e.g. Fran Odette, “Sexual Assault and Disabled Women” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: 
Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 173 at 174 – 175; Lise Gotell, 
"The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential Records: The Implications of the 
Charter for Sexual Assault Law" (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 251; Katherine D. Kelly, "'You must be crazy 
if you think you were raped': Reflections on the Use of Complainants' Personal and Therapy Records in Sexual Assault 
Trials" (1997) 9 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 178; Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, "Hearing the Sexual 
Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief' (2007) 52 McGill 
Law Journal 243; Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, "Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental 
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues" (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 515. 
34 For a discussion of these harms see R. v. C.C., 2019 ONSC 644 at para 78-79 (upholding the constitutionality of the 
new regime). 
35 AM, supra note 7 at para 23 and 38 – 40.   
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logic, he suggests that the 276 and 278 regimes are different because, unlike the impugned 
provisions, they do not compromise the integrity of the trial process.36 
In other cases, assertions about the unconstitutionality of the section 278.92 regime are 
made without attempting to distinguish its impact from that of regimes like the third-party records 
regime.  For example, in ARS (in concluding that the provision must be read so as to not require a 
pre-trial application to introduce a complainant’s private records or evidence of other sexual 
activity) Justice Breen implicitly overlooks the requirement that complainants be provided with 
notice and disclosure of third-party records applications.  He states, “I conclude that a statutory 
provision that compels disclosure of impeachment material to a complainant, in advance of cross-
examination, compromises the fairness of the trial contrary to s.7 of the Charter.”37 Third-party 
records obtained by accused individuals through a section 278 application, a copy of which is 
provided to the complainant in advance of cross-examination, are routinely used for impeachment 
purposes, as they were in R v Ghomeshi (discussed next).38  The novelty claims articulated in 
several of these decisions finding the new regime, or part of it, unconstitutional are not compelling. 
Now consider the claim that providing complainants with these applications in advance of 
trial will destroy the accused’s ability to conduct a proper cross-examination.  Again, the main 
issue under examination in all of the cases in which the provisions have been found to be 
unconstitutional is the new regime’s potential limits on the ability of the defence to surprise a 
complainant during cross-examination.  The key impact related to the ability to surprise identified 
in all of these decisions is the risk that a complainant will tailor her evidence, either knowingly or 
unwittingly, if she has knowledge of, and access to, these applications in advance of testifying.39  
There are instances in which the principles of fundamental justice require that an accused be 
permitted not to disclose records to a complainant prior to cross-examination.40  However, the right 
to cross-examination and the right to ambush or surprise a complainant during cross-examination 
are not co-extensive. The former is broader than the latter.  Yet, several of these cases treat them 
as analogous. In doing so, these cases overstate the impact of the regime on the accused’s right to 
cross-examination. 
Justice Rothery’s decision in Anderson, for instance, explicitly conflates the right to cross-
examination with the ability to surprise or ambush the complainant with evidence of which she is 
unaware.  Justice Rothery notes defence counsel’s submission that providing the complainant with 
these records in advance will make “[c]hallenging the credibility of the complainant…a 
meaningless exercise.”41  Later in the decision she states that, “these procedural screening 
requirements eviscerate the most valuable tool available to the defence in a sexual assault trial.”42  
In R v JJ, Justice Duncan concluded that the requirement that applications by the accused to 
 
36 Ibid at para 39.   
37 ARS, supra note 7 at para 78 
38 Ghomeshi, supra note 14. 
39 See e.g. DLB, supra note 7 at para 64; ARS, supra note 7 at para 70, 71.  
40 One example, the one drawn out in JJ, supra note 5 might be cases in which identity is at issue. See infra note 132. 
41 Anderson, supra note 7 at para 15. 
42 Ibid at para 21. 
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introduce a complainant’s private records be brought prior to trial would essentially eliminate the 
accused’s ability to impeach her as a witness.43 
It is true that removing the ability of the accused to cross-examine the complainant with 
information contained in her private records or evidence of her other sexual activity, without 
showing these records to her in advance, will in some cases limit defence counsel’s strategy.  But 
it is hyperbolic to suggest that without the ability to ambush complainants with their private records 
or prior sexual history the tool of cross-examination is “meaningless”.44  Nor is it convincing to 
implicitly equate knowledge of this one part of the accused’s case (her private records or evidence 
of prior sexual history) with full disclosure to the accused of all evidence and observation of all 
testimony, prior to him giving evidence, as was implied in ARS. 45  
The starting assumption in criminal proceedings is that the probative value of a witness’ 
evidence may be lost or diminished if she gains knowledge of what other witnesses have said.  This 
is why most witnesses are excluded until after they have testified.  This makes sense.  To the extent 
possible criminal procedures should avoid the risk that witnesses will be tainted by the evidence 
of others, or by knowledge of aspects of the accused’s case.  That this makes sense, and should be 
maintained to the extent possible, does not mean that any and all exceptions to the criminal 
procedures which eliminate this risk will by definition eliminate the value of cross-examining a 
witness.   
Some cases in which the section 278.92 regime has been found to be unconstitutional seem 
to assume that it is self-evident that section 278.92 will have this profound impact on the accused’s 
right to cross-examination. Take, for example, comments made about the case invoked in many of 
these Charter decisions: R v Ghomeshi.46  In Anderson, Justice Rothery accepted defence counsel’s 
suggestion that the impugned amendments will prevent defence counsel from using the very tool 
used in Ghomeshi to successfully challenge the evidence of the complainants.47  In JJ Justice 
Duncan identified Ghomeshi in her examination of the legislative context for Bill C-51.48  Later in 
her decision, after again referencing Ghomeshi, she suggested that the impugned regime (and in 
particular the requirement of a pre-trial application) has “effectively removed” defence counsel’s 
“ability to impeach a witness”.49 In AM Judge Henning accepted defence counsel’s reliance on 
Ghomeshi as an example of a case in which the effect of a legitimate cross-examination would 
have been limited or even eliminated by the impugned regime.50  In ARS Justice Breen 
acknowledged that the provisions appear to be Parliament’s response to Shearing, but suggested 
that the amendments were “spurred by the public response” to Ghomeshi.51   
 
43 JJ supra note 5 at para 84. 
44 Anderson, supra note 7 at para 15 
45 Supra note 7 at para 70 citing R v White [1999] OJ 258 at para 20.   
46 Supra note 14. 
47 Anderson, supra note 7 at para 15. 
48 JJ, supra note 5 at para 32- 34. 
49 JJ, supra note 5 at para 84. 
50 Supra note 7 at para 8 
51 ARS, supra note 7 at para 23.  He later suggests, at para 97, that Bill C-51 is, in fact, a codification of Shearing, 
supra note 3. 
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Many of these cases seem to have been litigated, or judicially reasoned, in the shadow of 
Ghomeshi.  Given the invocation of Ghomeshi in so many of these cases, it is worthwhile to assess 
whether the impugned provisions would have in fact rendered cross-examination meaningless or 
significantly limited in that case.  Consider, for example, the evidence of Lucy DeCoutere – one 
of the three complainants in Ghomeshi.   
Defence counsel Marie Henein’s cross-examination of DeCoutere was devastating.52  
Many of her attacks on the credibility and reliability of this witness were based on emails, 
photographs, and other forms of correspondence in the possession of the accused – records that 
would be captured by the new regime.  However, careful consideration of defence counsel’s 
conduct of the case with respect to this witness demonstrates that a great deal of her cross-
examination would have been unaffected had the section 278.92 regime been in force at the time 
of this trial.  Far from eviscerating the accused’s right to challenge the Crown’s evidence through 
rigorous and full cross-examination, a review of the trial transcript in Ghomeshi reveals the 
relatively modest impact that this regime would have had on the accused’s right to full answer and 
defence in that case.53  This is assuming that the Crown would have proceeded had it been aware 
of the records in the accused’s possession. Disclosure under the new regime would have given 
prosecutors the opportunity to re-evaluate whether there remained a reasonable likelihood of 
conviction.   
The analysis that follows is somewhat extended.  This is necessary.  Assessing arguments 
that rely on assertions about the self-evident impact of the section 278.92 regime on an accused’s 
right to cross-examination requires detailed analysis of the actual impact. 
Defence counsel’s cross-examination of Lucy DeCoutere can be organized into four topics: 
1) DeCoutere’s increased celebrity and media attention as a consequence of this case; 2) challenges 
to the plausibility of DeCoutere’s version of events, including what she remembered;  
3) DeCoutere’s motivation for, and feelings about, reporting Ghomeshi to the police; and  
4) DeCoutere’s post-incident interactions with and romantic/sexual feelings towards Ghomeshi.   
 
1. DeCoutere’s increased celebrity and media attention as a consequence of this case  
 
 DeCoutere, like Ghomeshi, was in the entertainment industry.  Defence counsel asked her 
numerous questions about the extraordinary number of media interviews she gave regarding her 
allegations against Ghomeshi.54  She was asked about the publicist she hired, and the way in which 
her photography show was purportedly promoted through interviews she gave about Ghomeshi.55  
Defence counsel asked her to confirm her strongly held desire that she not be included in the 
standard publication ban used to preserve the anonymity of sexual assault complainants: “Q. And 
 
52 Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 132, 138. 
53 R v Ghomeshi, Trial Transcript, Volume I – III (4 February 2016) Toronto 
4817 998 15-75006437 (ONCJ) [Ghomeshi, 4 February]; R v Ghomeshi, Trial Transcript, Volume I (5 February 2016) 
Toronto 4817 998 15-75006437 (ONCJ) [Ghomeshi, 5 February]. 
54 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol II, supra note 53 at 3-17. 
55 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 83. 
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do you recall telling Detective Ansari, “I would like to do anything I can to avoid being part of the 
publication ban?”56  She was asked to confirm that her Twitter account had gone from 1 000 to 25 
000 followers during this period.57 The probative value of these questions had nothing to do with 
surprising the complainant with records that were in the accused’s possession. The section 278.92 
regime would have had no impact on this aspect of Henein’s cross-examination. 
Defence counsel also relied upon electronic communications to raise inferences related to 
DeCoutere’s increased celebrity arising from this case.  DeCoutere, who was a professional actor, 
was cross-examined about emails she sent to one of the other complainants in which she stated 
“Dude, with my background I literally feel like I was prepped to take this on, no shit.  This trial 
does not freak me out.  I invite the media shit”.58  She was asked about an email in which she stated 
that she was excited to testify in court, which she described as “theatre at its best”.59  Defence 
counsel also asked her about emails in which she expressed exhilaration that Mia Farrow had 
mentioned her in social media in connection with this case, and that she might be on the cover of 
Vanity Fair.60   
These emails were obtained by defence counsel through a pre-trial, third-party records 
application, a proceeding in which the complainant was represented by independent legal 
counsel.61  The complainant and her lawyer either produced these emails for defence counsel (in 
response to a subpoena) or would have been given copies of them if they were produced by 
someone else.  Despite the fact that the complainant had pre-trial knowledge of these records and 
the accused’s argument regarding the basis for producing them, Henein was clearly able to use 
these emails to challenge the Crown’s case.  In his decision to acquit, Justice Horkin highlighted 
all of this evidence.  He suggested that there was a “live question” as to whether DeCoutere’s 
investment in serving as the public face of this case and a prominent figure in the social justice 
movement to resist sexualized violence “explained her questionable conduct as a witness”.62  The 
section 278.92 regime would not have limited this aspect of Henein’s cross-examination.   
 
2. Challenges to the plausibility of DeCoutere’s version of events, including what she remembered 
 
DeCoutere was cross-examined at length about the distinction between her highly detailed 
memory of events preceding the alleged attack and her memory failure with respect to the incident 
itself.63  DeCoutere relayed details about the type of food they had at dinner prior to the incident, 
details of their conversation that evening and how she felt, as well as details about Ghomeshi’s 
 
56 Ibid at 81. 
57 Ibid at 84. 
58 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 82. 
59 Ibid at 90. 
60 Ibid at 87. 
61Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 5.  See also Sarah Hampson, (25 March 2016) “Court not Arbiter of 
Truth, Lucy DeCoutere’s Lawyer Says” online: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/court-not-arbiter-
of-truth-lucy-decouteres-lawyer-says/article29397971/  (stating in an interview that she was retained to act for 
DeCoutere at a third-party records application in this proceeding). 
62Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 88 – 91. 
63 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 65-66. 
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house.64  However, her memory of the incident itself was less detailed, less consistent, and less 
vivid.65 She was cross-examined about the fact that she told the police that she had jumbled 
memories of the incident.66 Defence counsel asked her to explain why she could not remember, 
when reporting to the police or speaking with the media, the order in which the kissing and alleged 
choking and slapping had occurred.67  Henein also challenged her repeatedly about new details 
DeCoutere added for the first time while testifying – details she had not told the police about 
kissing prior to, and following, the alleged incident.68  
 
Justice Horkin’s conclusion that DeCoutere was not a credible and reliable witness was 
clearly based in significant part on this aspect of Henein’s cross-examination:  
 
[60]  It is difficult for me to believe that someone who was choked as part of a 
sexual assault, would consider kissing sessions with the assailant both before and after 
the assault not worth mentioning when reporting the matter to the police…. 
 
[61]  Ms. DeCoutere remembered and reported minute details of their date…All 
this was memorable and remarkable, yet she claimed to have left out the kissing and 
the cuddling because she thought brevity and succinctness were important. I do not 
accept this as a credible explanation.69 
 
These conclusions about the credibility and reliability of DeCoutere’s evidence were based on 
lines of cross-examination that would not have been limited, or even affected, had the section 
278.92 regime been in force at the time of this proceeding. 
 
3. DeCoutere’s motivation for, and feelings about, reporting Ghomeshi to the police 
 
DeCoutere was cross-examined at length about both her motivation for reporting her 
allegations to the police, and her feelings about legal proceedings against Ghomeshi.  She testified 
in direct that she was not sure when she went to the police what would happen or whether she was 
“going to press charges”, and that she “was not interested in any legal action”.70  Defence counsel 
convincingly challenged this evidence by introducing emails to a friend, sent a few days before 
DeCoutere went to the police, in which she told him “I’m going to press charges to get the ball 
 
64 Ibid at 61; 65-66. 
65 It is not unusual for a victim of trauma to have detailed memories of events and circumstances surrounding the 
violence they endured but fragmented memories of the incident itself.  See Lori Haskell and Melanie Randall, “The 
Impact of Trauma on Adult Sexual Assault Victims”, Justice Canada Report, 2018.  
66 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol II, supra note 53 at 20-23. 
67 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 57 – 59. 
68 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol II, supra note 53 at 21-23; Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 59 – 62; 65. 
69 Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 60 – 61. 
70 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 76. 
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rolling.”71  DeCoutere agreed during cross-examination that she had said she had compassion and 
sympathy for Ghomeshi and that she wanted to protect him.72  Again relying on emails between 
DeCoutere and this friend, presumably obtained through the third-party records application, 
Henein challenged this evidence: 
 
Q.  You do have compassion for him? 
A.  Yeah, I do. 
Q.  You feel sympathetic towards him? 
A.  Absolutely.  
Q.  All right.  And that is why you told your friend, Mr. Cutnor, on October 26th, "I 
want him fucking decimated." 
A.  Um – 
… 
Q.  How about this one, "The guy's a shit show, time to flush"?  That's said to your 
friend on November 13th, 2014.73 
 
Defence counsel went on to cross-examine her about emails in which she said she hoped Ghomeshi 
was “panic-eating” and had become really “chubby” and in which she said “Fuck Ghomeshi”.74  
Presumably the complainant was aware that defence counsel had this correspondence as a 
consequence of the pre-trial third-party records application at which she had standing and legal 
representation.  This evidence also appears to have informed Justice Horkin’s decision to acquit.75  
This part of Henein’s cross-examination would not have been affected had the new regime been 
in force at the time of this proceeding.  
 
4. DeCoutere’s post-incident romantic/sexual feelings towards, and contact with, Ghomeshi 
 
 One of the key facets of the defence’s case in Ghomeshi involved inconsistencies in 
DeCoutere’s statements about her feelings towards Ghomeshi, and her contact with him, following 
the alleged sexual assault.  DeCoutere told the police and the media that she had no romantic/sexual 
interest in Ghomeshi after the incident in which she alleges he choked and slapped her.76  She told 
the police that post-incident she only saw him in passing at industry events and that everyone knew 
she was not a fan of Ghomeshi.77  Defence counsel used email and handwritten correspondence 
between DeCoutere and Ghomeshi to very effectively challenge this evidence.  These were emails 
Ghomeshi had in his possession.  It was clear that DeCoutere had not seen them in years and likely 
 
71 Ibid at 77. 
72 Ibid at 79. 
73 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 79 – 80. 
74 Ibid at 81. 
75 Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 92-93. 
76 See e.g. Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 66, 67, 69, 91. 
77 Ibid at 91. 
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did not remember their contents.  At trial, DeCoutere repeatedly maintained the assertion that she 
had no ongoing romantic/sexual interest in Ghomeshi until she was confronted with this 
contradictory evidence during cross-examination.   
DeCoutere’s repeated insistence that she had had no post-incident romantic/sexual interest 
in Ghomeshi damaged her reliability and credibility as a witness.78  The probative value of her 
testimony was further diminished by the way in which her evidence of post-incident contact shifted 
between her statements to the police and media and her evidence at trial.  Following media reports 
that the complainant who testified before DeCoutere had been confronted with emails between 
that complainant and Ghomeshi from many years prior, and on the eve of her appearance at trial, 
DeCoutere approached the Crown with new information about her own post-incident contact with 
the accused.  Defence counsel raised the inference that DeCoutere intentionally misled the police 
and the Court about this post-incident contact and only revealed it when she realized that Ghomeshi 
likely had evidence of it in the form of emails she had sent to him years prior.   
Henein’s cross-examination of DeCoutere regarding her post-incident feelings towards 
Ghomeshi and her post-incident contact with him would have been adversely impacted had the 
defence been required to bring a section 278.92 application prior to trial seeking judicial 
authorization to rely on these emails.  However, the question is the degree and nature of the limit 
that the impugned regime would have placed on this part of the accused’s case.   It is clear that the 
emails would have been admissible under the new regime, given the inconsistencies they 
demonstrated.  It is also true that if the defence had been required to reveal these emails pursuant 
to a section 278.92 application, DeCoutere’s evidence at trial would likely have changed. She 
would almost certainly not have repeated during trial her assertions to the police about minimal 
post-incident contact with Ghomeshi.  She may not have repeated her assertion that she was not 
interested in him romantically (although this is less clear because she largely maintained this 
position even after she was confronted with these post-incident emails79).  Despite this reality, in 
a properly conducted proceeding, the impact that the new regime would have had on this part of 
the defence’s case, had it been in force, would have been more modest than one might assume.  It 
certainly would not have eviscerated or rendered meaningless the accused’s right to cross-
examination. Three reasons explain why this is true.  
The first reason stems from defence counsel’s failure to bring an application to introduce 
evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity pursuant to section 276 of the Criminal Code.  
Many of the emails in Ghomeshi’s possession that were used by Henein to challenge DeCoutere’s 
assertion to the police and evidence at trial that she had no ongoing romantic/sexual interest in 
Ghomeshi contained content that brought them within the scope of section 276.  For example, 
Henein cross-examined her on a photo DeCoutere sent to Ghomeshi in which DeCoutere was 




78 Ghomeshi, supra note 14. 
79 See e.g. Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 73. 
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Q. Right. So that’s the photo you send to him? That’s you holding a bottle? 
A. Yeah, it’s a ridiculous, sexualized photo of me drinking a bottle of beer. 
Q. So you sent him a photo of you fellating a bottle of beer? 
A. That doesn’t mean he didn’t assault me, but yes I did send that picture. 
Q. Well, we’re getting there, just wait. Just answer this question. You agree that you 
send a photo of you fellating a bottle of beer ... ?80 
 
Henein also cross-examined the complainant on an email she sent to Ghomeshi a few hours after 
the incident.  The email read: 
 
Getting to know you is literally changing my mind – in a good way I think.  You 
challenge me and point to stuff that has not been pulled out in a very long time.  I can 
tell you about that sometime and everything about our friendship so far will make 
sense. You kicked my ass last night and that makes me want to fuck your brains out.  
Tonight. Lucy DeCoutere.81 
 
The latter part of this email contains content that should not have been introduced without judicial 
authorization pursuant to a section 276 application.82 
Several of the post-incident emails Henein introduced had content that could be interpreted 
as sexual propositions by DeCoutere to Ghomeshi.  She told him she wanted to “play with” him83 
while they were both in Banff and suggested a “chance encounter in the broom closet?”84  She 
suggested “maybe dinner or perhaps I could tap you on the shoulder for breakfast?”85  In another 
post-incident email she asked “Will you lemme know how you are?  If there is an itch you 
need…um…scratching?”86  
 
80 Ibid at 65- 66. 
81Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 78.   
82 Any suggestion that the last sentence in this email would not be covered by section 276 because it pertained to the 
sexual activity in question would be wrong.  Henein clearly introduced it in order to challenge DeCoutere’s evidence 
to the police and to the Court that she did not have any ongoing, post-incident romantic/sexual interest in Ghomeshi. 
While DeCoutere’s email referenced their interactions on the night in question it was clearly introduced to demonstrate 
an inconsistency in her statements and testimony about her forward looking perspective on/feelings about Ghomeshi, 
ibid at 78-79: 
Q. “Kicked my ass last night and that makes me want to fuck your brains out.” And if there’s any confusion, 
you say “Tonight”. 
A. Mmhmm, I did say that. 
Q. Under oath, you have lied to His Honour.  You have said I didn’t want to have any romantic relationship 
with him.  I did not pursue a relationship. I… 
A. After that weekend, ma’am, after that weekend? 
Q. No, I asked you and you said I never sent any sexual emails…And then under oath before His Honour, 
you say the one thing you didn’t tell anybody is that when you walked out of the house you wanted to fuck 
his brains out the following night, right? That’s what you said in the email, isn’t that correct? 
83 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 41. 
84 Ibid at 44. 
85 Ibid at 49. 
86 Ibid at 64. 
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All of these records were introduced in order to challenge DeCoutere’s evidence to the 
police and to the Court that she did not have any ongoing romantic/sexual interest in Ghomeshi.  
Lest there be any question about the sexual nature of this evidence, Henein herself characterized 
these communications as “sexualized”, 87 “flirtatious”88 and “sexual”.89 These records included 
evidence of other sexual activity. It was the sexual nature of these communications that 
demonstrated the inconsistency in DeCoutere’s evidence and thus made them probative.90  It is 
true that section 276(4), which stipulates that sexual activity includes any communication made 
for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature, was not in force when the Ghomeshi 
trial occurred.91  However, by 2016 when the Ghomeshi case was tried several courts had already 
recognized that communications of this type were included within the scope of section 276.92 
Regardless, it is now clear, pursuant to section 276(4), that emails like these should not be 
introduced without an application and the requisite judicial screening under section 276 of the 
Criminal Code.  Had a section 276 application been brought by defence counsel prior to trial, as 
was required in 2016 under the previous statutory procedure for section 276 applications, 
DeCoutere would have been aware of this correspondence before testifying.  While she would not 
have had standing to make submissions on their admissibility, in a properly conducted proceeding 
she would have been made aware of their existence when the Crown consulted her for purposes of 
responding to the application.  It is true that the notice provision of the new regime, had it been in 
force, would have removed the accused’s ability to surprise her with these emails during cross-
examination.  The point is that if this aspect of the proceeding had been properly conducted, the 
element of surprise would also have been removed under the prior procedural provisions governing 
section 276 applications - a procedure which required a pre-trial application, a requirement that 
was explicitly affirmed in cases like JJ .93   
 
87 See Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 19:  
Q. And the other thing you tell [the police] is that the tone of the subsequent emails were less friendly than 
the previous emails and less sexualized, right? 
88 Ibid at 41: “Q. So you send him, you agree with me, a flirtatious email saying let’s get together?”  
89 Ibid at 79: “Q. No, I asked you and you said I never sent him any sexual emails 
90 Ibid at 64:  
Q. But, Ms. Decoutere, you told the police, you told His Honour, you told the country you didn’t have any 
kind of relationship with him. Then you told us, when you’re confronted with some of the emails, that you 
were trying ... now you admit you’re having a friendship with him but it wasn’t sexual. Now you admit 
that you’re sending sexual ... a picture of you with a bottle of beer, fellating it to Mr. Ghomeshi, right? 
91 Criminal Code, supra note 2.  Section 276(4) was added to the Criminal Code under the same Bill C-51 that added 
the section 278.92 regime. 
92 R v JSS, 2014 BCSC 804 (CanLII) at para 9 (defence sought to introduce provocative texts from complainant to 
accused as part of a section 276 application).  See also R v Clark 2013 ONCJ 260 at para 32; R v Zachariou, 2013 
ONSC 6694 at paras 18–21, [2013] OJ No 4899 (QL). Shortly after Ghomeshi’s trial the Newfoundland Court of 
Appeal, in R v SB (2016) NLCA 20 released a decision addressing the admissibility of sexualized text messages. The 
majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the emails should not have been admitted. The issue of whether these 
communications fell within the scope of section 276 was accepted without dispute by all levels of court in this case. 
93There is one exception: Justice Breen’s decision in ARS, supra note 7 to ‘read down’ the notice provision not only 
with respect to applications regarding the admissibility of private records in the possession of the accused but also 
with respect to section 276 applications.  This is a departure from all of the other cases addressing Charter challenges 
to the section 278.92 regime.  It is also a departure from the practice that has been followed for decades in Canadian 
courts. 
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There was another important piece of correspondence that Henein used to challenge 
DeCoutere’s credibility and reliability based on her police statements about post-incident contact 
and feelings: a letter written to Ghomeshi approximately two weeks after the alleged incident, in 
which DeCoutere told Ghomeshi that she “loved his hands”.94  Recall that DeCoutere’s allegation 
was that Ghomeshi choked and slapped her with his hands. She told the police and the Court that 
she could “still feel his hands on [her] throat”.95  The letter did not contain content that would bring 
it within the scope of section 276.  However, it likely would be considered a record in which the 
complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of section 278.92.96  In other 
words, the impugned regime, had it been in force at the time, would have eliminated Henein’s 
ability to surprise DeCoutere with this record.  DeCoutere testified that she did not remember this 
letter until it was presented to her.97  It seems highly likely that she would not have repeated to the 
Court her assertion to the police that she could still feel his hands around her throat if she had been 
made aware of this letter at a pre-trial application pursuant to section 278.92.   
In this regard the impugned regime would have placed a limit on the accused’s right to 
cross-examination.  But again, consider the actual impact it would have had on the accused’s right 
to use this letter to challenge the Crown’s evidence. The letter would clearly be admissible under 
the new regime. Henein would still have cross-examined DeCoutere on her statement to the police 
that she could still, so many years later, feel his hands around her throat.  Henein would have 
demonstrated the inconsistency between what she told the police and the contents of this letter - in 
which DeCoutere pointedly told Ghomeshi she loved his hands.  DeCoutere would still have had 
to explain how such a document accords with what she told the police (and the media).   
This raises a second reason why a requirement that defence counsel bring a pre-trial 
application to introduce these post-incident emails would not have significantly limited the 
accused’s right to cross-examine this complainant: most of the inconsistencies Henein focussed on 
were between these records and DeCoutere’s police statement.   
In JJ, Justice Duncan suggests that “[a]t its heart, a strict reading of the timing provisions 
in the legislation substantially alters the traditional paradigm of confronting a witness with 
contradictory evidence to defend oneself.”98  Discussing the Ghomeshi proceeding, she asserts that 
“[d]efence counsel cross-examined the complainants extensively on communications they had 
with the accused after the alleged sexual assaults, using those communications to contradict 
elements of the complainants’ evidence-in-chief as well as for other purposes.”99  In fact, Henein 
mostly used the records that the accused had kept to contradict DeCoutere’s police statement, not 
her evidence in chief.100  She repeatedly emphasized that DeCoutere gave her statement to the 
 
94 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 89. 
95 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 72 – 73. 
96 See e.g R v Quesnelle 2014 SCC 46, para. 22; R. v. R.M.R., 2019 BCSC 1093 at para 36 – 39; MS supra note 9 at 
para 50.  But see R v. W.M. 2019 ONSC 6535. 
97 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 82. 
98 Supra note 5 para 82. 
99 Ibid at para 32 
100 See e.g. Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 90: 
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police under oath,101 that she had been cautioned about making false statements to the police102, 
and that she had been given multiple opportunities by the police to tell them about her post-incident 
contact with Ghomeshi.103  While she did assert that these inconsistencies were repeated to “His 
Honour”,104 her focus and emphasis was on the discrepancies between these post-incident emails 
and DeCoutere’s assertions to the police (and the media105).106  
In assessing her credibility and reliability on the basis of statements DeCoutere made about 
the nature of her contact with, and feelings towards Ghomeshi, after the alleged incident, Justice 
Horkins did find that DeCoutere “attempted to mislead the Court”.107  However, Justice Horkin 
also focussed substantially on inconsistencies between her post-incident emails to Ghomeshi and 
her statements to the police.108   
Why emphasize that the cross-examination and reasons for acquittal primarily focussed not 
on inconsistencies between the records and DeCoutere’s evidence in chief, but rather between what 
the records revealed and what DeCoutere told the police?  It demonstrates that, had these records 
been revealed to DeCoutere through a pre-trial section 278.92 application, this line of cross-
examination and this judicial reasoning would not have been foreclosed.  It is true that, had she 
been privy to these records prior to trial, the complainant would have had an opportunity prior to 
testifying to develop an explanation as to why she was not forthcoming with the police.  But 
 
Q. Now, when you go to the police and they question you, they specifically ask you about your subsequent 
contact with Mr. Ghomeshi, right? 
A. Right. 
… 
Q. Do you see there, about six lines from the bottom you say, “For the most part, people just knew that I 
wasn’t a big fan of his. I did see Jian in passing after that at events or whatever.” Do you recall telling that 
to the police? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And you were under oath when you gave that statement, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. All right. And then do you recall that they asked you again about what your interaction was…. 
See also ibid at 93. 
101 See e.g. ibid at 90; 94.  
102 See e.g. Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 12, 77. 
103 See e.g. ibid at 90 – 97. 
104 Ghomeshi 4 February Volume III, supra note 53 at 69. 
105 Ibid at 71.  
106 Ibid at 74-76. 
107Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 81. Notably, the records he relied upon to make this particular finding, ibid at para 
82-84 were mostly ones that contained sexual content which would be subject to section 276 of the Criminal Code. 
108 Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 66 – 67: 
[66] Lucy DeCoutere swore to the police that after the alleged assault in 2003 she only saw Mr. 
Ghomeshi “in passing”….Ms. DeCoutere was asked directly by the police interviewers to tell them 
everything about her relationship with Mr. Ghomeshi, before and after the alleged assault.  
 
[67] It became clear at trial that Ms. DeCoutere very deliberately chose not to be completely honest 
with the police.  This statement was subject to a formal caution concerning the potential criminal 
consequences of making a false statement. It was given under oath, an oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, not a selective version of the truth. Despite this formal caution and oath, 
Ms. DeCoutere proceeded to consciously suppress relevant and material information. This reflects very 
negatively on her general reliability and credibility as a witness…. 
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whatever explanation she might have given would not have eliminated the probative value of these 
records to demonstrate that her statements to the police under oath, after having been cautioned to 
tell the truth, were either dishonest or unreliable. 
In JJ Justice Duncan also asserts that the ability of defence counsel to point out to the trier 
of fact that a complainant’s change in evidence after she gained knowledge of records following a 
section 278.92 application is “cold comfort to an individual charged with a serious crime.”109  It 
certainly was not cold comfort in Ghomeshi.  Defence counsel in Ghomeshi very effectively 
challenged DeCoutere’s credibility and reliability by cross-examining her on the changes and 
additions to her statements to police upon learning indirectly that Ghomeshi likely had emails from 
her which contradicted what she originally told the police.  Rather than cold comfort for the 
accused, this shift in her story made for fertile and dramatic grounds of cross-examination - 
grounds that were relied upon by the trial judge in his decision to acquit Ghomeshi.110 
 There is a third reason why pre-trial disclosure of these post-incident emails from the 
complainant would not have limited the accused’s right to cross-examination to the extent one 
might assume.  There were inferences of two types of inconsistency at play in much of Henein’s 
questioning about these post-incident emails.  These records were ostensibly introduced simply to 
demonstrate inconsistencies or untruths in DeCoutere’s police statement.  However, in questioning 
her on these records Henein repeatedly emphasized not only their inconsistencies with her police 
statements but also the importance of reporting to the police any post-incident intimacy between 
DeCoutere and Ghomeshi.  Consider, for example, this line of questioning: “Q. You didn’t 
understand the importance that you kissed him goodbye, you didn’t understand the importance of 
that…?”111  Reflect, also, upon the following questions about a photograph that DeCoutere did not 
remember, or know existed, of her and Ghomeshi snuggling in a park the day after the alleged 
assault:112  
 
 Q. You didn’t [understand] the importance that you spent the entire day, the entire 
next day with him? 
A. I didn’t understand because it doesn’t impact that he, the fact that he assaulted me. 
Q.You didn’t understand the importance of the fact that you were spending a romantic 
day with him, you were cuddling with him, you were having brunch with him…you 
didn’t understand the importance of that when Detective A[] asked you how that 
weekend played out? 
… 
Q. All right. And so that to you, your evidence under oath before his Honour, is that 
was just all vague; you didn’t realize that that was important information for the 
police?113  
 
109 Supra note 5 at para 81. 
110 Ghomeshi, supra note 14 at para 56 -57. 
111 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 74. 
112 Ibid at 72. 
113 Ghomeshi 4 February Vol III, supra note 53 at 74. 




To be clear, DeCoutere’s explanation for failing to disclose this information to the police was 
her belief that it was not important.  One might argue that Henein’s follow-up questions were 
simply a response to this explanation.  That argument would be unconvincing. Henein’s questions 
were clearly intended to suggest that it would be unreasonable for anyone to think that post-
incident contact with one’s alleged abuser was anything other than critically important information 
for the police to be given.  What inference drives the notion that this was critically important 
information?  Underpinning the repeated assertion that this was important information for the 
police is the inference that intimate behavior subsequent to the date of the alleged assault is 
inconsistent with how one would expect someone who has been sexually assaulted to behave. This 
inference is evident in questioning such as the following: 
 
Q. And so that’s you cuddling Mr. Ghomeshi? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that’s the man you said earlier had choked and slapped you?114 
 
Henein repeated this line of questioning later in her cross-examination: 
 
Q. And you didn’t tell the police about the snuggling in the park the next day, right? 
A. No, ‘cause it had completely slipped my mind. 
Q. Slipped your mind that you were snuggling with the man you say slapped and 
choked you?115 
 
She returned to this theme again in a set of questions about an email exchange between DeCoutere 
and Ghomeshi approximately three months after the alleged sexual assault: 
 
Q….And so that’s you reaching out to the man you say sexual[ly] assaulted you on 
July 4th, to confide in him about your feelings about your job, and to ask him for advice, 
right? 
A. Advice.  I’m not sure if I am asking for advice here anywhere. 
Q. Are you confiding in him? 
A. I…I am telling him a story. It’s an email. It’s sharing my day and what’s going on. 
Q. Sharing your day and what’s going on with the man that had sexually assault[ed] 
you, right, unprompted? Right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right.116 
 
 
114 Ibid at 73. 
115 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 20. 
116 Ghomeshi 5 February Vol I, supra note 53 at 31. 
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She raised the inference again in a set of questions regarding an email DeCoutere sent to Ghomeshi 
after she saw him at the Geminis a few months after the alleged incident: 
 
Q. And you tell the media, CBC Radio, that he touched your throat [at the event] and 
after that, that was it, right? 
A. That remains true. 
Q. But the one thing you don’t actually tell anybody is that you write to him, right? 
The guy you say just reminded you of sexual[ly] assaulting you? 
A. Yeah, it was weird. 
Q. Well, not only was it weird, it doesn’t make sense right?117   
 
In a later line of questions she again pursued this theme, using sarcasm to deliver her point: 
 
Q. And when you send it to Mr. Ghomeshi you send it in an email. And you say to 




Q. That’s not normalizing the situation, right? That’s not making him feel 
comfortable? You’re now not in Banff anymore, you’re sending him the picture of you 
and Mr. Ghomeshi singing “Hit Me Baby One More Time”, with the sentence, “proof 
that you can’t live without me”.  Didn’t you say he sexually assault[ed] you?118 
 
It is true that these emails, assuming one accepts that the complainant had a privacy interest in 
them, would have to be disclosed to the complainant as part of the section 278.92 application 
process. However, once again consider the actual impact that this would have had on Ghomeshi’s 
right to full answer and defence. First, the discrepancy demonstrated by these records was with 
what DeCoutere told, and did not tell, the police. Henein would still have been able to cross-
examine her on the inconsistency between these records and her statement (and multiple follow-
up emails) to the police, as explained in the previous paragraphs.  Second, the portions of her cross-
examination on these records aimed at challenging DeCoutere’s credibility by triggering the 
inference that if Ghomeshi had actually slapped and choked her she would not have cuddled with 
him in the park the next day or sent him emails asking to meet up should not have been permitted.  
The Crown should have objected to, and Justice Horkins should have intervened to stop, any 
questions which were reliant for their probative value on discredited and impermissible stereotypes 
about how real sexual assault victims behave.119  Disclosure under the new regime will facilitate 
 
117 Ibid at 38-39. 
118 Ibid at 52-53. 
119 R v ARD, 2017 ABCA 237 at para 58 (aff’d SCC); R v DD [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 65. 
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the Crown’s duty to protect the process from being distorted by rape mythology by enabling 
prosecutors to better prepare for trial. 
Again, questions highlighting the inconsistency between telling the police she had very 
little to do with Ghomeshi following the alleged incident, and emails or photographs demonstrating 
the opposite, were permissible.  Questions that challenged DeCoutere’s explanation for these 
inconsistencies were equally appropriate.  Several of Henein’s questions were focussed on these 
inconsistencies.  But her repeated and skeptically, or sarcastically, couched assertion ‘and this is 
the same man you say sexually assaulted you’ was arguably intended to trigger a stereotype that 
has been legally rejected.120  Questions with this emphasis should not have been asked. Any limit 
that would be placed on defence counsel’s inclination to ask them (by requiring that private records 
be screened in a pre-trial application) should not be included in a constitutional assessment of the 
impact that the 278.92 regime will have on an accused’s right to cross-examination.  If the section 
278.92 regime deters defence counsel from asking these types of questions, because the element 
of surprise has been removed, all the better - particularly given the tenacious ability of these 
stereotypes to infect judicial reasoning.121   
Unspecified, hyperbolic, assertions about the effect of the section 278.92 regime on an 
accused’s ability to challenge Crown evidence results in reasoning which risks overstating the 
impact of the impugned provisions on an accused’s right to cross-examination.  Invoking 
Ghomeshi as a self-evident example of the drastic impact that the section 278.92 regime will have 
on accused individuals’ right to cross-examination exemplifies this point.  Careful and rigorous 
dissection of the Ghomeshi proceeding demonstrates the opposite: even in a case in which the 
accused is in possession of records the contents of which the complainant is unaware, and which 
will be extremely damaging to her evidence, the impact of the section 278.92 regime caused by 
the loss of opportunity to ambush or surprise may be relatively modest.  
One further point must be addressed.  The inconsistencies that Henein sought to reveal 
were between records in the accused’s possession and DeCoutere’s police statements (and media 
statements).  Some courts have pointed out that the section 278.92 regime’s impact on the right to 
cross-examination may be heightened when the accused seeks to establish an inconsistency 
between the private record and the complainant’s evidence at trial.122  There is a concern, in other 
 
120 ARD, ibid 
121 Despite cautioning himself against relying on “false stereotypes concerning the expected conduct of complainants” 
(supra note 14 at para 135) Justice Horkin in the very next paragraph (ibid at para 136), commented:  
Each complainant in this case engaged in conduct regarding Mr. Ghomeshi, after the fact, which seems 
out of harmony with the assaultive behaviour ascribed to him. In many instances, their conduct and 
comments were even inconsistent with the level of animus exhibited by each of them, both at the time 
and then years later. In a case that is entirely dependent on the reliability of their evidence standing 
alone, these are factors that cause me considerable difficulty when asked to accept their evidence at full 
value. 
The second two sentences of this paragraph rely on specific evidence in this case and are not problematic.  
However, the first sentence appears to invoke Justice Horkin’s ‘common sense’ assumption about what type of 
conduct is “out of harmony” with how women will respond to being slapped, choked and hit in the context of a 
sexual interaction. 
122 See e.g. ARS, supra note 7 at para 71; DLB, supra note 7 at para 66. 
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words, that the adverse impact on the accused’s ability to properly test the complainant’s evidence 
will be heightened in cases in which the inconsistency with the private record does not already 
exist (in, for example, a police statement, preliminary inquiry transcript, or other record.) 
This is not a concern in cases in which the records contain evidence of other sexual activity.  
Defence counsel are not permitted to ask questions to elicit evidence of other sexual activity in 
order to establish an inconsistency with records in the possession of the accused that contain sexual 
content.  To permit this would allow an end run around the rape shield protections.  As such, in a 
properly conducted proceeding, the section 278.92 regime would have no impact in this 
circumstance. 
Nor is there a well-founded concern of heightened impact, because the inconsistency has 
not crystalized, in cases in which the records contain non-sexual but highly sensitive and personal 
information - for example, records that contain information about a complainant’s eating disorder, 
suicidality, or physical abuse as a child.  In a properly conducted proceeding defence counsel 
would not be permitted to ask the complainant questions eliciting this type of evidence in an effort 
to impugn her credibility by establishing an inconsistency with a record in the accused’s 
possession.  In a properly conducted proceeding the Crown would object on the basis that the 
question was prejudicial and did not appear to be relevant, or the trial judge would intervene to 
require that defence counsel establish relevance before the witness be required to answer the 
question.  If defence counsel could not point to an inconsistency already on the record (such as in 
a police statement or preliminary inquiry transcript), but rather acknowledged that he or she was 
asking the question in order to establish an inconsistency with records in the possession of the 
accused, the question would be disallowed.  That is to say, in a properly conducted proceeding, 
defence counsel would not be permitted to ask such questions about highly sensitive information 
merely in an effort to establish inconsistencies – to test whether a sexual assault complainant is 
willing to be forthcoming in a public setting about, for example, her eating disorder, suicide 
attempts, or physical abuse as a child.  Therefore, in a properly conducted proceeding, the section 
278.92 regime would have no impact, let alone a heightened impact, in this circumstance.   
This leaves records in the possession of the accused which do not contain sexual content 
or other quite personal information but that are included within the scope of the section 278.92 
regime because they are either records enumerated under section 278.1 or non-enumerated records 
that contain information in which the complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Think, 
for example, of school attendance records, or employment attendance records.  Preventing the 
accused from impugning a complainant’s credibility by attempting to establish an inconsistency 
between a section 278.1 record that does not contain particularly sensitive or personal information 
and the complainant’s evidence at trial (by surprising her with it) does place a limit on the 
accused’s right to cross-examination.  In cases in which the records in the possession of the accused 
fall within the scope of section 278.1 but do not contain sexual or deeply personal information, 
and in which an inconsistency does not already exist (such as one between the record and the 
complainant’s police statement) defence counsel should be permitted to bring the application 
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during cross-examination.  Section 278.92 already provides for this possibility through the 
discretion granted to trial judges to waive the notice period.123 
Defence counsel who are uncertain as to whether records in the accused’s possession contain this 
type of personal information ought to bring a pre-trial motion for direction from the Court.  
Defence counsel remain free under the new regime to withhold records that do not fit within 
the scope of section 278.1, ask questions during cross-examination, and then introduce the records 
if the complainant’s answers demonstrate inconsistencies. Again, defence counsel who are unclear 
whether a record falls within section 278.1 should bring a pre-trial motion for direction. 
It should be evident from this discussion that the understandable concern in some of these 
Charter decisions that the impact of the regime is more problematic when the inconsistency does 
not already exist - that is to say when defence counsel hopes to establish an inconsistency through 
cross-examination – will not arise in many circumstances and can be addressed through the 
discretion granted to trial judges to waive the notice period when it does arise. 
 
ii. Assumptions About the Impact on the Truth-Seeking Function of the Trial  
 
There is an undefended assumption in some cases that prior knowledge of this part of an 
accused’s case will inevitably diminish the credibility and reliability of a complainant’s evidence. 
This assumption may distort conclusions about the impact that notice to complainants of private 
records in the accused’s possession will have on the truth-seeking function of the trial.  As Justice 
Raikes notes in CC, “it is debatable whether ambushing a witness [] aids or impairs the truth-
seeking function of a trial.”124  That said, courts are understandably concerned that complainants 
who are made aware, prior to testifying, of the content of private records in the possession of the 
accused will “tailor their evidence”125 in response.  This is a risk.  Just as it is a risk when a 
complainant testifies after a mistrial or a successful appeal of a conviction, and in every trial in 
which an accused testifies.126  Just as it is a risk in a trial in which an investigating officer is 
exempted from the witness exclusion order, despite being a witness in the proceeding, so that he 
or she may assist the Crown, or when the accused is required to disclose aspects of their defence 
in a third-party records application. 
Several points about this risk should be considered.  First, we ought not to assume that 
advance knowledge of this type of evidence will always reduce the veracity or accuracy of the 
complainant’s evidence.  In MS, Justice Chapman suggests that “[the regime] enhances rather than 
 
123 Criminal Code, supra note 2. 
124 R. v. C.C., 2019 ONSC 6449 at para 80. 
125 ARS supra note 7 at para 71. 
126 Suggesting that this too is a risk to the truth-seeking function of the trial, as a factual matter, is different from the 
constitutionally impermissible tactic of implying before a trier of fact that an accused’s testimony should be weighed 
in light of the reality that he or she has testified after hearing the entirety of the Crown’s case.  So too is it different 
from suggesting that accepting this risk in the context of the accused’s testimony is analogous to accepting it with 
respect to the complainant’s testimony.  Our constitutional commitment to avoiding wrongful convictions makes the 
tolerance for this risk, or risk assessment, different in these two circumstances. Nevertheless, as a factual matter, the 
analogy is apt.  
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detracts from the truth-seeking process. It would be unreasonable to expect a complainant, 
testifying about an embarrassing and personal subject matter, to respond logically, coherently and 
calmly when confronted with such material out of the blue.”127  Justice Chapman notes that 
“private records, or evidence of sexual history, when put to a complainant with inadequate prior 
notice, logically invites a response that is generated by fear, humiliation, confusion or anxiety, and 
not one that is comprehensive and responsive, and conducive to getting at the truth.”128  
Indeed, it may be that the failure to provide notice creates a greater risk of dishonesty, 
obfuscation, or lack of clarity in a complainant’s evidence.  This is not because women tend to lie 
about rape – as the stereotype suggests129 – but because the legacy of legal discrimination against 
sexual assault victims and the ongoing social suspicion with which some, if not many, sexual 
assault complainants are viewed (especially, for example, Indigenous women, women with 
disabilities or those marginalized on the basis of poverty),130 discourages victims from being open 
and forthcoming about any information that is likely to trigger any of the common stereotypes 
used to discredit survivors of sexualized violence.   
Perhaps the witnesses in Ghomeshi did not lie about, or minimize, their subsequent 
communications and interactions with the accused in order to cover up or further untruthful 
accounts of him slapping or choking them without their consent.  Perhaps the inaccuracies and 
omissions in their evidence arose from an understandable fear that they would not be believed if 
people knew that they cuddled with him the day after being strangled, or sent him flowers and 
intimate notes.  Allowing a sexual assault complainant to reflect upon, so that she might explain, 
why she sent a letter espousing her love for the accused’s hands after she says she was strangled 
and slapped by him is much more likely to yield a comprehensive and candid response than 
trapping her in a lie about something she was understandably afraid or embarrassed to admit, or 
that she has forgotten.  
If we accept that sexual assault complainants are no more inclined towards lying than other 
types of witnesses, then the question is straightforward.  Which poses a greater risk to the truth 
seeking function of the trial: a process which plays on a complainant’s understandable fear and 
distrust of the criminal justice system by attempting to catch her in lies and omissions about private 
records or prior sexual activity in a high stress, anxiety provoking, and potentially humiliating 
cross-examination, or one that puts her on notice that she is rightly going to need to explain to the 
court any gaps and inconsistencies in her evidence demonstrated by the contents of such records? 
Presumably, in most cases it is the latter.  To be clear, a ‘shift’ in one’s evidence is not by definition 
a threat to the truth-seeking function of the trial. It is only those shifts away from the truth that 
pose this threat. As Justice Moldaver recently stated in R v Goldfinch: 
 
127 Supra note 7 at para 104. 
128 Ibid at para 105. 
129 R v AG [2001] 1 RCS at 443. 
130 R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 1: “We live in a time where myths, stereotypes, and sexual violence against 
women — particularly Indigenous women and sex workers — are tragically common.” 
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[t]he s. 276 regime is designed to respect and preserve the rights of both complainants 
and accused persons by excluding evidence which would undermine the legitimacy of 
our criminal justice system and inhibit the search for truth, while allowing for the 
admission of evidence which would enhance the legitimacy of our criminal justice 
system and promote the search for truth.131 
 
Like section 276, the section 278.92 regime is, to borrow from Justice Moldaver, “not a zero sum 
game”.132  The aim of the regime is to promote, not undermine, the truth seeking function of the 
trial.  Some limits on the accused’s right to cross-examination may actually further this truth-
seeking function.   
Lastly, the risk to the truth-seeking function of the trial posed by a complainant’s potential 
shift in evidence is not the same in every case.  There are limited circumstances in which it will be 
necessary to avoid disclosing records to a complainant in advance of her testimony.  That is to say, 
there are circumstances in which disclosing the record to the complainant in advance of the 
proceeding could destroy, or dramatically reduce, its probative value.  A likely, albeit very 
uncommon,133 example would involve cases in which the identity of the accused is at issue and 
the record pertains to identity.  In such cases trial judges have discretion under the provision to 
waive the notice requirement.  This discretion granted to judges under the regime ought to be 
considered in assessing the impact on the accused’s right to cross-examination of granting 
complainants notice and standing.  
 
iii. the section 278.92 regime does not violate the right against self-incrimination 
 
The principle against self-incrimination protects accused individuals from being compelled 
to aid in their own prosecution.134    One aspect of the right against self-incrimination is the ‘case 
to meet' principle: accused individuals do not need to respond until the Crown has established a 
prima facie case.135  In some section 278.92 cases courts have concluded that requiring the accused 
to bring a pre-trial application to introduce private records or extrinsic sexual activity evidence 
 
131 2019 SCC 38 at para 81. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Identity of the accused is not frequently at issue in sexual assault trials because most sexual assaults are perpetrated 
by individuals who are known to the complainant, and in the rare cases involving strangers there may be DNA 
evidence.  Nevertheless, it is clear that in those cases in which identity is at issue the element of surprise may be 
sufficiently important such that the discretion to waive the pre-trial notice ought to be granted.  That said, in those 
infrequent cases in which identity is at issue the regime may not even apply.  It seems unlikely that the accused will 
be in possession of the private records of a complainant he does not know.  The uncommonness of such circumstances 
may explain why in JJ, supra note 5 at para 76 Justice Duncan developed a hypothetical fact situation that relied on 
rather unusual facts to demonstrate this potential impact on the accused’s rights. In her hypothetical a complainant 
alleges sexual assault by an unknown man at a costume party at which all of the men are dressed the same and wearing 
cartoon masks. 
134 Lisa Dufraimont, "The Patchwork Principle against Self-Incrimination under the Charter." (2012) 57 Supreme 
Court Law Review 241.  See  R v White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417. 
135 R v P(MB), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 at para 36. 
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offends this principle of fundamental justice.136  This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Darrach in the context of section 276 applications.137  The Court concluded that 
requiring the accused to establish the admissibility of prior sexual history evidence prior to the 
Crown having adduced its ‘case to meet’ does not violate the right against self-incrimination.  
According to the Court in Darrach, the section 276 process does not create a legal or evidentiary 
burden; the accused is not obligated to bring a section 276 application to introduce other sexual 
activity evidence.  The tactical choice to do so does not violate the principle against self-
incrimination.  Similarly, choosing to seek admissibility of a complainant’s private records is a 
tactical choice, not a legal obligation. 
The courts in JJ and ARS attempted to distinguish Darrach on the basis that, in Justice 
Breen’s words, “[i]mplicit in the Court's reasoning is a view of apprehended consent as an 
affirmative defence, independent of the prosecution's obligation to establish the essential elements 
of the offence.”138  His argument is that in cases in which the evidence is to be used to impeach a 
Crown witness, rather than establish an air of reality to the honest but mistaken belief in 
communicated consent ‘defence’, it is a violation of the ‘case to meet’ principle to require advance 
disclosure.  He argues that the Court’s conclusion in Darrach only applies to an accused’s tactical 
burden to respond to the Crown’s case by introducing evidence to support a defence.  This, he 
suggests, is distinct from a requirement to disclose evidence that will be used to impeach a Crown 
witness.139  
The Court in Darrach did not limit its conclusion about the relationship between the section 
276 regime and the principle against self-incrimination in the manner suggested by Justice Breen.  
The Court stated: 
 
The tactical pressure on the accused to testify at the voir dire under s. 276 is neither a 
burden of proof nor an evidentiary burden.  It derives from his desire to raise a 
reasonable doubt about the Crown’s case by adducing evidence of the complainant’s 
prior sexual activity…. If the evidence is found to be admissible under s. 276, it may 
then serve to satisfy the evidentiary burden of adducing a factual basis for a defence 
(such as honest but mistaken belief in consent) or to raise a reasonable doubt about 
an element of the offence…(emphasis added).140 
 
Evidence of other sexual activity is admitted in sexual assault prosecutions for 
purposes unrelated to a ‘defence’ of consent or honest but mistaken belief in communicated 
consent, such as to reveal a prior inconsistent statement or a complainant’s motive to lie. The 
attempt in JJ and ARS to distinguish Darrach on this point results in a puzzling conclusion.  
 
136 See e.g. ARS, supra note 7; JJ, supra note 5. 
137 Darrach, supra note 29 at para 50 – 52.   
138 ARS, supra note 7 at para 65. 
139 Ibid at para 66. 
140 Supra note 29 at para 51. 
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Are these courts suggesting that an accused is required to bring a section 276 application in 
advance if the evidence is relevant to the ‘defence’ of honest but mistaken belief in 
communicated consent but not if the evidence is ostensibly probative of an assertion that the 
touching did not occur?   
As described, the section 278.92 regime does place some limits on the accused’s right to 
cross-examination.  However, these limits are not self-evidently substantial.  In striking down the 
regime in Anderson, Justice Rothery refers to “an unencumbered cross-examination”.141  That is 
not what the Charter guarantees.142  The question is whether the extent and nature of these limits 
strike a constitutional balance when weighed with the other protected interests legislated under 
section 278.92.  Answering this question requires careful assessment of these other protected 
interests.   
 
III. The Constitutionally Protected Interests Legislated under the Section 278.92 Regime  
 
The constitutionality of the section 278.92 regime turns on whether the provisions strike a 
just balance between an accused’s right to full answer and defence and the complainant’s dignity, 
equality, and privacy interests - along with broader societal interests in ensuring a fair and humane 
process.  This requires a precise and nuanced assessment of the actual impact on the accused’s 
right to full answer and defence, which was addressed in the previous section.  It also requires 
proper consideration of these other constitutional interests.  In addition to hyperbolic assertions 
about the impact of the section 278.92 regime on the accused’s right to challenge the Crown’s 
evidence, some legal reasoning concluding that the regime, or parts of it, are unconstitutional fails 
to properly recognize the competing constitutional interests at issue. This tends to occur in three 
ways.   The first involves a failure, in some cases, to fully recognize what the competing interests 
at stake in this Charter analysis are, and to recognize that these are also principles of fundamental 
justice and therefore must be balanced with the right to a fair trial.143  Second, in several cases the 
assessment of the competing interest that is consistently identified – the complainant’s privacy - 
is not sufficiently contextualized, resulting in a failure to properly balance one of the regime’s 
central objectives.144  Third, some cases wrongly conclude that the privacy, equality and dignity 
interests of the complainant are only engaged at the point when defence counsel seeks to adduce 
the evidence.145  In fact, the constitutionality of both the procedural and substantive aspects of the 
section 278.92 regime must be assessed in light of the accused’s rights and the rights and interests 




141Anderson, supra note 7 at para 22. 
142 R v RV, 2019 SCC 41 at para 40. 
143 Anderson, supra note 7; AM, supra note 7.  
144 DLB, supra note 7; Reddick, supra note 7; Anderson, supra note 7; JJ, supra note 5; ARS, supra note 7. 
145 ARS, supra note 7; AM (ON), supra note 7 at para 44. 
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i. The right to a fair trial is not the only principle of fundamental justice at issue  
 
Consider first the failure to properly identify the interests to be balanced.  Section 7 of the 
Charter protects against state caused deprivations of one’s liberty, if such deprivation is not in 
accordance with our principles of fundamental justice.  The only principles of fundamental justice 
considered in cases like AM and Anderson are the accused’s fair trial rights, as manifested through 
the principle against self-incrimination and the right to cross-examination.  While AM and 
Anderson both recognize that the impugned regime aims to protect the privacy of sexual assault 
complainants, neither decision explicitly recognizes the complainant’s privacy interest as a 
principle of fundamental justice that must also be weighed in determining whether the regime 
breaches section 7. 146   In addition, in determining whether the section 278.92 regime breaches 
section 7, neither AM nor Anderson balances full answer and defence with the complainant’s 
dignity and equality interests or broader societal objectives like encouraging the reporting of sexual 
assault.  For example, in Anderson Justice Rothery states: “the issue is the balancing of the 
accused’s right to full answer and defence as against the complainant’s privacy rights in electronic 
communications.”147  There is no discussion of the complainant’s dignity and equality interests or 
the societal interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual violence in Anderson.148  It is clear that 
the purpose of the new regime is to protect all of these interests.149  It is equally clear that in the 
context of this legislation these are constitutionally protected interests. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly stated that in assessing the constitutionality 
of  legislation that seeks to protect full answer and defence and sexual assault complainants, several 
principles of fundamental justice need to be balanced.  According to the majority in R v Mills, an 
“assessment of the fairness of the trial process must be made “from the point of view of fairness 
in the eyes of the community and the complainant” and not just the accused.”150 The majority in 
Mills noted that “[t]he ability to make full answer and defence, as a principle of fundamental 
justice, must therefore be understood in light of other principles of fundamental justice which may 
embrace interests and perspectives beyond those of the accused.”151 The majority in Mills also 
 
146 In AM supra note 7 at para 42, Judge Henning does conduct some balancing at the section 1 stage of his analysis.  
He suggests that the impugned regime’s breach of the accused’s section 7 rights is not justified under section 1, in part 
because there are already strong legislated protections that shield complainants from unwarranted intrusions into 
privacy and sexual history and that dispel improper stereotypes. This balancing should have been part of the prima 
facie breach analysis rather than the section 1 analysis. More importantly, his reasoning is not compelling. In terms of 
privacy intrusions, he is referring to the section 278 third-party records regime – which does not address the 
admissibility of a complainant’s private records.  In terms of the latter two – sexual history and improper stereotypes 
– he is referring exclusively to the section 276 regime.  That there are exclusionary rules with respect to irrelevant 
and/or discriminatory evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity has no bearing on whether a constitutional 
balance has been struck with respect to the procedure and rules of admissibility regarding private records that do not 
contain sexual content.   
147 Supra note 7 at para 14.  See also e.g. at paras 12, 18, 20, 22. 
148 Supra note 7. She again reduces the competing interest(s) to the complainant’s right to privacy in her section 1 
analysis: R v AM [2020] SJ No 31 at para 9. 
149 See e.g. AM (ON) supra note 7 at para 41. 
150 [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 72 (citing R. v. E. (A.W.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 155). 
151 Ibid at para 73. 
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stated that “under s. 7 rights must be defined so that they do not conflict with each other.  The 
rights of full answer and defence, and privacy, must be defined in light of each other, and both 
must be defined in light of the equality provisions of s. 15.”152  In R v Seaboyer, Justice McLachlin 
(as she then was) observed that the principles of fundamental justice include trial fairness but also 
include “broader societal concerns”.153 This was affirmed by Justice Gonthier in R v Darrach.154  
The unanimous decision of the Court in Darrach summarized the reasoning in this line of cases as 
follows: the principles of fundamental justice include not only protecting the rights of the accused 
but also “protecting the integrity of the trial by excluding evidence that is 
misleading…encouraging the reporting of sexual violence and protecting “the security and privacy 
of the witnesses.”155  As recently observed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Sullivan, this 
“internal balancing of competing Charter protected interests” is “required [when assessing] the 
constitutionality of a legislated compromise between protected interests” such as “the privacy and 
equality rights of sexual offence complainants on the one hand, and the right[s] of the accused” on 
the other.156  
Like the legislative regimes discussed in Mills, Darrach, and Seaboyer, the section 278.92 
regime reflects a legislated arrangement between the privacy, equality, and dignity interests of 
complainants, the public interest in encouraging sexual assault victims to report, and the accused’s 
fair trial rights.  In assessing the constitutionality of the section 278.92 regime under section 7 of 
the Charter these protected interests must be balanced.  Some of the decisions striking down the 
section 278.92 regime failed to conduct this required internal balancing.157  The failure to include 
an assessment of the impact on a complainant’s dignity and equality interests and on the societal 
interest in reducing barriers to reporting sexualized violence caused when a complainant is 
ambushed on the stand with records containing her private information is inconsistent with the 





152 Ibid at para 21. 
153 [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 603. 
154 Darrach supra note 29 at para 24. 
155 Ibid at para 25. 
156 2020 333 at para 58.   
157 See e.g. Anderson, supra note 7; AM, supra note 7.  There may be some confusion regarding the manner in which 
considerations of the public interest factor into a section 7 Charter analysis.  In Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford, 
2013 SCC 72 at para 125 the Supreme Court of Canada observed that section 7 and section 1 ask different questions.  
With respect to principles of fundamental justice such as arbitrariness or vagueness, the government’s objective or the 
public interest is balanced at the section 1 stage of the analysis.  This is not true in cases in which a public interest – 
such as the public’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault - is itself a principle of fundamental justice 
and is at issue. 
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ii. The nature of the privacy interest protected by the section 278.92 must be 
understood in context 
The privacy interest protected under the new regime is far-reaching.  It reflects an attempt 
by Parliament to recognize that in many sexual assault proceedings the complainant’s autonomy, 
and thus humanity, is at stake.  As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Mills, “it has long been 
recognized that this freedom not to be compelled to share our confidences with others is the very 
hallmark of a free society”.158  
Not only is privacy the only interest identified in some cases, none of the decisions striking 
or reading down section 278.92 adequately contextualized, and thus properly recognized, the 
nature of the privacy interest that the section 278.92 regime seeks to protect.  Take, for example, 
Justice Ahktar’s assertion in Reddick that “there is no reason why an accused in possession of these 
documents should not be able to surprise a witness with them in sexual assault cases when they 
are able to do so in any other type of offence.”159  In fact, there are reasons why surprising sexual 
assault complainants with private documents is different than surprising other types of witnesses.  
The nature of the protected privacy interest under 278.92 must be assessed in relation to its context: 
an allegation of sexual violence. As Justice McLachlin observed in Mills: “the intimate nature of 
sexual assault heightens the privacy concerns of the victim.”160   Simply put, sex and all things 
related, are socially constructed as deeply private. The impact of an intrusion into the privacy of a 
sexual assault complainant will often be qualitatively worse than a similar breach with respect to 
the alleged victim of a fraud or theft, for example.   
Moreover, the privacy protection offered by rules such as section 278.92 must be 
understood in light of both a legal history in which women who alleged rape were laid bare, put 
on trial, and often explicitly discriminated against, and the ongoing (often necessary) practice of 
scrutinizing to a highly granular degree every detail of a sexual assault complainant’s allegation. 
This too makes the nature of the privacy interest different in this context.  Some intrusions into the 
privacy of a sexual assault complainant are a necessary part of the criminal justice process.  In 
some circumstances ensuring a full and rigorous ability to challenge the Crown’s case, such as a 
case in which identity is at issue, will require that defence counsel be permitted to bring an 
application after the complainant’s testimony has begun.  The aim of section 278.92 is to eliminate 
or reduce the unnecessary intrusions, and the needless ambushes, such as those driven by a legal 
legacy which discriminated against women or an ongoing social reality in which attitudes continue 
to be informed by problematic and empirically unfounded social assumptions about sex and 
women (particularly marginalized women).161 
 
 
158 Supra note 150 at para 74. 
159 Supra note 7 at para 49. 
160 Supra note 150 at para 92. 
161 Supra note 4. 
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In addition, understanding the nature of the privacy interest at stake requires recognition of 
the interconnectedness between the privacy interest protected under section 278.92 and the dignity 
and equality rights that the regime seeks to preserve.  Discussing this relationship in the context of 
third-party records sought by the accused, Justice McLachlin explained that failing to protect 
communications between a sexual assault complainant and her doctor perpetuates the disadvantage 
experienced by sexual assault victims, in part due to the heightened privacy concerns they 
experience.162  This makes it more difficult for victims, who are often women, to seek legal 
recourse for the wrong/s they have suffered.163  As a result, she explains, 
the victim of a sexual assault is…placed in a disadvantaged position as compared with 
the victim of a different wrong. The result may be that the victim of sexual assault does 
not obtain the equal benefit of the law to which s.15 of the Charter entitles her. She is 
doubly victimized, initially by the sexual assault and later by the price she must pay to 
claim redress…164 
 
Justice McLachlin went on to note: “These concerns highlight the need for an acute sensitivity to 
context when determining the content of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, and 
its relationship to the complainant’s privacy right.”165  This equality interest is heightened for 
survivors whose lives have been heavily documented.166  As a consequence of structural 
discrimination, Indigenous women, racialized women, women living with disabilities and women 
living in poverty are more likely to have been scrutinized through state apparatus  The more records 
that exist, the greater the jeopardy to privacy interests, and the higher the barriers to reporting. 
Again, the scope of the accused’s fair trial rights must be interpreted in light of the privacy 
[and equality] interests of complainants.167 The latter must be calibrated in context.  This includes 
recognizing that the gendered nature of sexual violence will often produce a context in which an 
accused has access to and power over many aspects of a complainant’s private or intimate life.  It 
also requires recognition of the increased scrutiny and corresponding documentation to which 
women marginalized on the basis of race, Indigineity, disability, and poverty are subjected.  With 
respect, there are indeed reasons why a legal process aimed at achieving a just balance between 
competing interests would limit an accused’s ability to surprise a complainant with her private 




162 Mills, supra note 150 at para 92. 
163 Ibid at para 92. 
164 Mills, supra note 150 at para 92. 
165 Ibid at para 93. 
166 See e.g Karen Busby, “Discriminatory Uses of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases” (1996) 9:1 CJWL 148. 
167Ibid at para 94; Kelly, supra note 33. 
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iii. The protected interests legislated under the sexual assault provisions of the 
Criminal Code are both substantive and procedural 
Some cases did recognize that the equality and dignity interests of sexual assault 
complainants also have a constitutional foundation and must be balanced with the accused’s right 
to a fair trial.168  Unfortunately some of these decisions still fail to assess the constitutionality of 
the regime, in particular the procedural parts of the regime, in light of both the accused’s right to 
a fair trial and these competing interests.  For example, in ARS Justice Breen did not recognize 
that these other principles of fundamental justice inform not only the admissibility criteria under 
the regime but also its procedural aspects.  The fundamental flaw in Justice Breen’s Charter 
analysis in ARS is captured in the following two sentences: “the complainant's constitutionally 
protected interests are only engaged at the point the defence seeks to elicit such evidence. A judicial 
determination of admissibility, at this point and in accordance with ss.276(2) or 278.92(2), fully 
protects a complainant's right to privacy and equality.”169  With respect, Justice Breen’s reliance 
on the reasoning in Shearing as the basis for his conclusion that a complainant’s interests are 
protected solely through the admissibility assessment is misleading.  The passage from Shearing 
that he draws upon for this proposition might, on its own, support his assertion.170  But once one 
considers the context in which the Court made this statement in Shearing it becomes evident that 
it does not support Justice Breen’s conclusion.  
In Shearing the Court was grappling with whether the accused was required to relinquish 
records already in his possession and then make an application for production under section 278 
or whether it was sufficient to hold a voir dire on admissibility. The Court concluded that an 
admissibility voir dire was the appropriate process, in part because the privacy interests protected 
under section 278 by limiting the ability of an accused to use the state’s power to produce a sexual 
assault complainant’s private records were not at issue. The accused already had the record.  It was 
in this context that the Court in Shearing made the statement that all that was required to protect 
the complainant’s interests was an admissibility hearing.   
In Justice Breen’s analysis the constitutionality of the procedural aspects of the regime 
turns exclusively on the accused’s interests and not broader societal factors or the complainant’s 
equality and dignity interests.  For example, based on his reasoning, the constitutionality of the 
timing of a section 276 application turns exclusively on the rights of the accused.  He states: “it is 
the judicial determination of admissibility itself that protects the privacy interests of the witness 
and the broader policy concern of encouraging complainants to come forward and/or seek 
counselling services.”171  In AM(ON) Justice Christie similarly concludes that “it is not the timing 
of these applications, but rather the requirement for the application itself that achieves the[] 
purposes and objectives” of the legislation.172  This is not correct.   
 
168 ARS, supra note 7 at para 37; JJ, supra note 3; AM (ON), supra note 7. 
169 Supra note 7 at para 94. 
170 ARS, supra note 7 at para 95 quoting Shearing, supra note 3 at para 110. 
 
171 ARS, supra note 7 at para 96. 
172 Supra note 7 at para 42. 
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The section 278.92 regime does establish threshold criteria for the admissibility of certain 
types of evidence.  But the regime also attempts to protect the privacy, equality, and dignity 
interests of complainants, and the broader societal interest in encouraging reporting by treating 
complainants humanely, throughout the process.  It does so by including certain procedural 
requirements with respect to sexual history evidence and private records.  The 7 day notice 
provision is one example.  As Justice Chapman notes in MS: “the reality of the historic 
disadvantage women and children have faced in seeking justice in cases of sexual abuse cannot be 
ignored and indeed further perpetrated through an evisceration of what is the obvious intent of 
Parliament – namely that, as much as possible, evidence of other sexual activity be vetted prior to 
trial.”173 
The notice provision is only one of the procedural protections not captured by the 
admissibility rules.  For instance, a complainant is not (under the new regime nor was she under 
the prior provisions) compellable at a voir dire to determine the admissibility of evidence of her 
other sexual activity.174  Similarly, hearings to determine section 276 applications are held in 
camera to preserve the complainant’s privacy should the application be dismissed.175  Like the 
notice provision, these procedural rules aim to protect a complainant’s privacy, dignity and 
equality prior to the stage of the proceeding at which admissibility is determined.  Contrary to 
Justice Breen’s conclusion, the complainant’s privacy, dignity and equality interests are not “fully 
protected”176 by the judicial determination to admit or exclude evidence of her other sexual activity 
or private records. 
The requirement that applications be brought prior to trial protects the dignity, equality and 
privacy interests of complainants and promotes a humane process in several ways.  Consider the 
following three: 1) the notice provision enables Crowns to properly prepare these vulnerable 
witnesses; 2) it avoids bifurcated proceedings which can cause complainants an undue amount of 
stress and hardship and; 3) it enables complainants to make an informed decision about whether 
to participate in a potentially traumatic legal proceeding.  All three of these protections engage the 
equality, privacy and dignity interests of sexual assault survivors.  None of them are achieved by 
the admissibility decision. 
 
1. A fair trial requires that Crowns perform their duty to properly consult and prepare 
vulnerable witnesses such as sexual assault complainants  
 
In R v Darrach the Supreme Court of Canada determined that accused individuals who 
sought to rely upon evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity to defend themselves against 
sexual assault allegations “could not do so in such a way as to surprise the complainant”.177 
 
173 Supra note 9 at para 92 
174 Criminal Code, supra note 2, section 278.94(2). 
175 Ibid, section 278.94(1). 
176 ARS supra note 7 at para 91. 
177 Darrach, supra note 29 at para 55.  
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Defence counsel’s argument that the requirement that the accused disclose this aspect of his 
defence violated the Charter because “the element of surprise was essential to his cross-
examination” was rejected.178  In arriving at this conclusion the Court in Darrach expressly 
contemplated that the Crown would consult with complainants on section 276 applications.179  
For Crowns to properly consult with complainants on a section 278.92 application, the 
application must be brought before the complainant testifies.  Rules of professional conduct 
prohibit Crowns from communicating with a complainant during cross-examination.  As Justice 
Chapman notes in R v MS: “[p]resumably the Supreme Court in Darrach, in approving of the 
Crown’s ability to consult with the complainant concerning the contents of the [accused’s] 
affidavit, was not suggesting it was appropriate to do so while she is under cross-examination by 
defence counsel.”180  In addition, while not explicitly precluded from doing so by rules of 
professional conduct, some Crown Attorneys may be wary of consulting with a complainant after 
she has taken her oath.  In other words, some Crowns may be unwilling to consult with a 
complainant even during direct examination or after direct is finished but before cross-examination 
has begun.  Routinely permitting section 278.92 applications after the complainant has begun 
testifying will preclude the ability of the Crown to consult with the complainant.181   
In addition to inhibiting the Crown’s ability to respond properly to the application by 
consulting with the complainant, precluding the ability of the Crown to consult with complainants 
on these applications adversely impacts the dignity and equality interests of complainants by 
impeding preparation of the complainant for trial.   In Darrach the Supreme Court noted the trial 
judge’s comment that: “part of the purpose of the section 276.1 proceeding was to prepare the 





178 Ibid at para 9, 55. 
179 Darrach, supra note 29 at para 55.  In R v FA, [2019] OJ No 3041 at para 67 Justice Caponecchia found no 
compelling reason why “defence disclosure of private records being adduced in evidence should be treated any 
differently than disclosure of someone’s private sexual activity.  Both pertain to sensitive information over which a 
complainant has a privacy interest.” 
180 MS, supra note 9 at para 90. 
181 In Reddick, supra note 7, Justice Akhtar, in striking down the regime, concludes that this consultation should not 
include providing the complainant with the application. It seems likely that, prior to the enactment of Bill C-51 some 
Crowns did provide complainants with the application and others did not.  Justice Akhtar’s reasoning on this point is 
difficult to understand. Whether complainants receive a physical copy of the application or are given a written or 
verbal summary of the evidence the defence seeks to admit is irrelevant. Moreover, Justice Akhtar’s suggestion that 
Crowns ought not to explain to complainants the accused’s argument on admissibility of the evidence, and his assertion 
that all the Court meant in Darrach, supra note 29 was that Crowns reveal the nature of the evidence to the complainant 
so that she is not ambushed with discriminatory evidence are specious.  The Court in Darrach used the word “consult”.  
The Court recognized that the Crown, in preparing its response to the admissibility argument, would consult with the 
complainant.  This would, of course, in some cases necessitate explaining to her why defence counsel wanted to 
introduce the evidence.        
182 Supra note 29 at p 453. 
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All witnesses require proper preparation.  Given the granular degree to which sexual assault 
complainants are likely to be questioned, and the highly sensitive evidence at issue, Crown 
preparation may be even more important for these witnesses.183  Part of that preparation includes 
consultation on section 276 applications. This would include, for example, explaining to 
complainants what a section 276 application is, what limits such evidence can be used for, and 
what to expect in terms of cross-examination on the specific evidence included in the application. 
While testifying as a sexual assault complainant is always likely to be a difficult and upsetting 
process, the trauma of the trial process can be mitigated by properly preparing complainants.  
Permitting accused individuals to routinely bring these applications during the trial will remove 
this protection for complainants.  
One related point should be highlighted.  In Reddick Justice Akhtar determines that the 
Court in Darrach did not envisage that complainants would have the right to retain counsel and 
receive privileged advice on the evidence sought to be adduced through a section 276 
application.184 He suggests that the new regime problematically denies the accused disclosure on 
the complainant’s comments, reactions to, or explanation regarding the application because such 
communications will now be privileged.  This is an unconvincing argument.  First, complainants 
have always had the right to retain legal counsel.  Communications between sexual assault 
complainants and their legal counsel, on any aspect of a case, have always been privileged.  
Second, and relatedly, whether a complainant retains a lawyer to advise her in the context of a 
sexual assault trial in which she serves as a witness, does not absolve the Crown of its duty to 
consult and prepare her – and any communications arising from these consultations and 
preparation will still be subject to the Crowns’ disclosure obligations under R v Stinchcombe.185  
 
2. Routinely Permitting Mid-trial Applications Will Result in Bifurcated Trials That Impose 
Significant Harms on Complainants 
Several courts have recognized the procedural delays which would arise if accused 
individuals were routinely permitted to bring section 278.92 applications mid-proceeding.186  
Justice Akhtar explained the substantial procedural issues that would arise:  
 
The trial would necessarily be halted to allow the disclosure of the records. Counsel 
for the complainant would have to be retained, meet with the complainant, prepare a 
response, file materials, and argue the matter in front of the trial judge. This could 
conceivably delay the trial for weeks if not months. Such methods would be 
unworkable in a jury trial.187  
 
183 I explained and supported this assertion in Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of 
the Legal Profession, (McGill-Queens University Press: Montreal, 2018) Chapter 5. 
184 Supra note 7 at para 62 – 66. 
185 See R v AM, 2020 ONSC 8061 at para 88. 
186 FA, supra note 179 at para 62; MS, supra note 9. 
187 Reddick, supra note 7 at para 72.  To be clear, Justice Akhtar, found that the section 278.92 regime was 
unconstitutional.  While he accepted that the 7 day notice period for section 276 applications was necessary, he struck 




As Justice Chapman observes in MS, “[r]ealistically this would mean that many sexual assault 
trials will take place on a bifurcated basis.”188  This would impose two types of burdens on 
complainants. Most acutely, it would require them to remain under oath for days, weeks or months 
while the application is addressed.  More generally, delay in sexual assault proceedings adversely 
impacts the life circumstances of accused individuals, complainants, and the friends and family of 
both. 
While complainants in criminal proceedings do not share the accused’s right to a timely 
trial, there is nevertheless a timing related equality interest that must be considered in assessing 
the constitutionality of the requirement that section 278.92 applications be brought prior to trial 
whenever possible.  Indeed, the implications of a bifurcated proceeding on the complainant’s 
equality interests are grave.  A bifurcated proceeding in which a sexual assault complainant’s 
testimony is paused while an accused brings an application to introduce evidence of her other 
sexual activity, or her private records, will in some cases force complainants to remain under oath 
for weeks or months.  Consider the possible implications for a sexual assault survivor.  For weeks 
or months she will be unable to discuss with a therapist or loved ones her thoughts, reactions to, 
and feelings about the questions she was required to answer during her testimony.  She will endure 
the physical and psychological stress of readying herself to testify in a sexual assault proceeding 
not once but twice.  She will be unable to ask any questions of the Crown during these weeks and 
months of waiting.  Crowns may be hesitant to communicate at all with the complainant - or will 
be inclined to limit themselves to written communication regarding procedural issues such as the 
date of the complainant’s next appearance in court.  Imagine the impact that this lack of 
communication could have on complainants whose living conditions, mental health, or 
employment are unstable.  Allowing sexual assault trials to be bifurcated in this manner is certain 
to disproportionately harm sexual assault complainants who are marginalized on the basis of race, 
Indigeneity, income and/or disability. 
In addition to the specific harms that will be imposed because complainants will be ‘hung 
up in their oaths’, the interruption caused by a bifurcated proceeding will impose the types of 
general harms always caused by delayed justice.  In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada 
acknowledged the harm caused to all participants in a criminal proceeding when a resolution is 
delayed.189  The Court recognized that “[v]ictims and their families, who in many cases have 
suffered tragic losses, cannot move forward with their lives” until the case is resolved.190  It is not 
uncommon for survivors of sexualized violence to delay obtaining counselling, pursuing 
education, or dating until after they have ‘gotten through the trial’.  Given the scarcity of judicial 
and court resources and the competing time demands on practicing lawyers, interrupting a 
 
down the provisions granting complainants standing at the admissibility voir dire (and thus by implication disclosure 
of the application), as well as the limits on the admissibility of other types of records in the possession of the accused. 
188 Supra note 9 at para 97. 
189 2016 SCC 27 at para 2-3. 
190 Ibid at para 2.  
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complainant’s testimony in order to bring a section 278.92 application is certain to extend this 
difficult process for complainants by weeks, if not months.  
As Justice Chapman notes, the prospect of mid-trial applications “will likely have a very 
real adverse impact on a complainant’s decision as to whether or not she wants to dispute the 
admission of her sexual history evidence thus necessitating the agony of ongoing proceedings.”191  
Put most starkly, these mid-trial applications will force women to choose between “availing 
themselves of their equality rights” and enduring the consequence, or “giv[ing] up on those rights 
altogether”.192  The Charter analysis in lower court decisions in cases like ARS and JJ, which ‘read 
down’ Parliament’s requirement of a 7 day notice period, failed to include an assessment of these 
impacts on the equality interests of complainants.   
 
3.  Equal protection of the law demands that, to the extent possible, complainants have the 
ability to make an informed decision about whether to participate in a potentially traumatic legal 
proceeding 
 
One of the dignity and equality interests served by the section 278.92 regime, and in 
particular the requirement that an application be brought prior to trial, is that it gives sexual assault 
survivors the ability to make an informed choice about whether they want to serve as a complainant 
in a sexual assault trial. While it is true that individuals can be compelled to serve as complainants 
in criminal proceedings, many prosecutors take the policy position that, as a general matter, sexual 
assault victims ought not to be compelled to participate.  As Justice Karakatsanis observed in R v 
RV: “[t]estifying in a sexual assault case can be traumatizing and harmful to complainants.”193  
Complainants should, to the extent possible, have the ability to make the difficult decision to 
undergo this often harmful and traumatizing experience in an informed manner.  As Justice 
Chapman noted in R v MS in explaining the advantages of requiring that section 276 applications 






191 MS, supra note 9 at para 106. 
192 Ibid.  In AM (ON), supra note 7 at para 89 Justice Christie responds to this concern by arguing that “this could 
equally be said of the pre-trial process, that complainants may not want to be involved and, therefore, give up on those 
rights altogether”.  With respect, his response misses the point made by Justice Chapman. Presumably, her point was 
that a mid-trial application and the resulting bifurcated proceeding adds to the burdens born by a sexual assault 
complainant. 
193 2019 SCC 41 at para 33.  See also Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and 
Women’s Activism, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012); Cheryl Regehr, Ramona Alaggia, Liz Lambert, & 
Michael Saini, “Victims of Sexual Violence in the Canadian Criminal Courts” (2008) 3 Victims and Offenders 99; 
Mary Ross, “Restoring Rape Survivors: Justice, Advocacy, and a Call to Action” (2006) 1087 Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences 206 at 218 – 222; Cheryl Regehr & Ramona Alaggia, “Perspectives of Justice for Victims 
of Sexual Violence” (2006) 1:1 Victims & Offenders 33. 
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one incidental benefit of the notice requirements is that complainants can make an 
informed decision as to whether or not they wish to take part in a trial…It may well 
make a difference to a complainant if she is not only being made to testify to events 
that are the subject of the charge but also, for example, the sexual abuse she 
experienced at the hands of her father.194 
 
The same may be true with respect to evidence that does not fall within the scope of section 
276 but that is contained in a record in the accused’s possession in which she has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  For example, a sexual assault complainant’s decision to be a part of a 
criminal trial might be influenced by whether she will be confronted with records revealing details 
about her eating disorder, that she stole from her parents, or about her multiple suicide attempts.   
Sexual assault is “not like any other crime”195 and sexual assault trials are unlike most other 
types of criminal proceedings.  The vulnerability of complaining witnesses in sexual assault 
proceedings, coupled with the need to ensure that an individual accused of a sexual offence has 
the proper latitude to rigorously test the Crown’s evidence including that of the complainant, 
necessitates granting complainants the ability, whenever possible, to make an informed decision 
about whether to undergo the difficult and often traumatic experience of cross-examination.  This 
is a matter of equal protection under the law.   
IV. Conclusion 
 
Were it true that a complainant’s advance knowledge of aspects of the accused’s trial plan 
by definition, or automatically, “eviscerated” or rendered “meaningless” his right to cross-
examination it would be impossible to hold a constitutionally sound re-trial following an appeal 
or mistrial.  It would mean that the unsuccessful Charter challenges to the section 276 regime196 
and the third-party records regime197 in the 1990s and early 2000s were wrongly decided.  It would 
put into question advance disclosure obligations with respect to the defence of alibi.  That is not 
to suggest that the reality of these other contexts in which advance knowledge occurs means that 
 
194 Supra note 9 at para 92. In AM (ON), supra note 7 Justice Christie responds to this argument by asserting that a 
complainant can still make an informed decision because defence counsel can be expected to notify the court at the 
pre-trial conference that he or she anticipates a section 276 application – that knowledge that such an application may 
or will be brought is sufficient for complainants to make an informed decision in advance of trial as to whether to 
voluntarily participate. This is not a compelling argument.  There is no reason to assume that complainants will be 
able to guess what evidence the defence seeks to adduce.  Indeed, most of the Charter challenges to the new regime 
are premised on the assertion that the element of surprise is fundamental to defence counsel’s ability to properly cross-
examine the complainant. Moreover, the anguish caused to complainants who are put on notice that the accused will 
seek to introduce evidence of their other sexual activity or of their private records but not told what private records or 
which sexual activities is sure to discourage survivors from turning to the legal system to respond to their experiences 
of sexual violation.  
195 Seaboyer, supra note 153 at 648. 
196 Darrach, supra note 29. 
197 Mills, supra note 150. 
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it is constitutional in this context.198  The pertinent question, in assessing the constitutionality of 
the section 278.92 regime, is whether the limits that this will place on an accused’s right to full 
answer and defence are contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.  This requires identifying, 
with precision, what these limits actually are in practice and then balancing them with the other 
protected interests legislated under the regime.  This was not done properly in cases like ARS, JJ, 





198 This point is made in both ARS, supra note 7 and JJ, supra note 5.  Notably, the Ontario Court of Appeal relied 
upon precisely this type of reasoning in R v Darrach (1998), 38 OR (3d) 1 to uphold advance disclosure under the 
section 276 regime. 
199 Supra note 7. 
